Coordination Of Closed-loop Chain With Sales Effort Under Premium And Penalty Mechanism

In recent years, individual countries successively promulgated relevant laws and regulations to improve the environment owing to environmental problems. In response to the national government’s call, more and more scholars and entrepreneurs start to be committed to research of closed-loop supply chain as to the supply chain management, In order to increase the enthusiasm of the recycling of waste products, a large numbers of governments issued some incentive measures. Therefore, under the government incentives, the research of closed-loop supply chain related issues, not only has important theoretical significance, but also has a certain practical value.First of all, the article in the introduction part mainly expounds the research background and meaning of closed-loop supply chain problems and points out many problems existing in the supply chain management and the corresponding solutions. In the actual economic market, the supply chain members are in constant competition. Manufacturers may pay quality effort in order to guarantee the quality of products; Retailers often increase sales by the shelf display, advertising, quality assurance. All of these means can be referred to as hard in the aggregate. This article studies the closed-loop supply chain coordination model with sales efforts under the condition of the rewards and punishment mechanism,Second, under the background of closed-loop supply chain with rewards and punishment mechanism, we establish the corresponding supply chain model considering demand influenced by marketing efforts and retail price at the same time. Under the centralized decision-making, we studied the optimal strategy of the supply chain system and given the existence condition of the optimal solution.Under decentralized decision making, we mainly analyses the strength of rewards and punishments and sales efforts as to the influence on both sides of supply chain members. Thus, we can conclude that the optimal recovery rate increases with the increase of sales efforts, recovery and sales efforts increases with the strength of rewards and punishments. Then, we make the supply chain to achieve coordination state by using franchising contract and give numerical example and chart analysis.Finally, under the background of closed-loop supply chain with rewards and punishment mechanism, we establish the corresponding supply chain model considering the manufacturers and retailers bilateral asymmetric information situation. We studied the optimal decision problem respectively under the condition of symmetric information and asymmetric information using game theory. Under the condition of symmetric and asymmetric information, we respectively explores the Stackelberg game dominated by the manufacturer and the retailer. Under symmetric information, the particular form of the optimal solution is given; Under the asymmetric information, we verify the existence of optimal solution by a numerical example and discuss the effect of related parameters on the members of the supply chain profit. Thus, we can conclude that the profits of manufacturers and retailers under the asymmetric information is respectively larger than those under the symmetric information. At the same time, in each game model, with the parameter λ increasing, the corresponding members of profits will also increase.