Research Of Disclosure Model For The Competing Supply Chains With The Asymmetric Information On Demand Disruption

We study the optimal solution of the competing supply chains with two kinds of information types on the disrupted demand amount, and investigate the effects of information sharing on the optimal equilibrium solution by means of optimization theory and information mechanism design principles of game theory. Each supply chain consists of one manufacturer and one retailer, while both retailers compete in the market with a linear Cournot demand.We first study the model with symmetric information on the disrupted demand. In the case, each manufacturer knows the real disrupted damand state and can obtain her maximal profit while the downstream retailer only obtains his reservation profit. Second, we study the disclosure model for asymmetric disruption information.Through this study, we obtain the Nash equilibrium and the robust regions of the production plan for both different information types. For both information types, manufacturer always obtains her maximal profit while the downstream retailer only obtains his reservation profit. Meanwhile, there are robust regions for each manufacturer’s production plan regardless of the disrupted demand states. That is, when the disrupted amount of the demand is sufficiently small, the optimal trading quantity will be unchanged. However, some special measures, e.g., the higher unit wholesale price, should be taken to prevent the downstream retailer from deviating the trading quantity of the original plan. We also find that the high-disruption retailer gets his information rent due to asymmetric information, which results in the higher profit than that in the symmetric information. Interestingly, some counter-intuitive managerial insights can be observed in the robust region. What’s more, we find that Cournot competition results in the less retail price and the lower performance for the whole channel.This thesis consists of five chapters. In the first chapter, we introduce the research background and current situation of the development of supply chain disruption management. The second chapter briefly introduces the knowledge of principal-agent theory. In the third chapter, we study the effects of information sharing on the optimal solution of the competing supply chains through the analysis of two information types. In the fourth chapter, we give some numerical examples to illustrate the conclusions obtained in the third chapter. The last chapter makes a summary and outlook for the thesis.