Game Analysis Of Competing Supply Chains Under Demand Information Asymmetry

With the development of technology and economic globalization, the competition betweenenterprises has been transformed into the competition between the supply chains. At the same time,downstream firms tend to hide some important information to upstream firms in the supply chain,such as cost information, demand information, etc. So, it is more reasonable and realistic toinvestigate competition supply chains under imcomplete information.In this thesis, we investigate the game problem of two competing supply chains base on Bertrandmodel under demand information asymmetry by two different contracts, and consider threeinformation structures, i.e., information sharing in both supply chains; information sharing in only onesupply chain and information sharing in neither supply chains.In the first two chapters, we focus on introducing the research background, main results ofsupply chain management as well as the corresponding theories and methods in the field of supplychain. In Chapter three, we investigate the game problem of competing supply chains base on thewholesale price contract. We find that (1) In the high demand state, the information sharing providedby the retailer will increase not only her wholesale price, but also the wholesale price of competingmanufacturer regardless of whether the competing supply chain has information sharing;(2)Information sharing in a supply chain always benefits its manufacturer, but hurts its retailer; while itwill benefit both the manufacturer and the retailer of competing supply chain, regardless of whetherthis competing supply chain has information sharing. In Chapter four, we investigate the gameproblem of competing supply chains base on contract menu. We find that (1) In the high demand state,the decisions of players are not influenced by the information sharing;(2) In the low demand state,information sharing can promote the retailer to order more items, but reduce the order quantity of thecompeting retailer. Different from Chapter three, information sharing has no effect on the decisions ofplayers under high demand state. And in the low demand state, information sharing may reduce thewholesale price of competing manufacturer. At the same time, information sharing may increase theretail price of competing retailer when the probability of high demand state is large. In Chapter five,we summarize this article and further point out that other work can be studied later.