A Study On Game Model With Electronic Waste Of Recycling And Processing In Competing Supply Chains

The rapid growth of the number of waste electronic products has brought enormous pressure ofresources and environment to the society,Europe and the United States and other developedcountries carried out the work of waste electronic products’ recycling of relevant legislation andpractice earlier,and the waste electronic products have been recycled and treated effectively rely onthe perfect recycling and treatment systems.The Chinese government also attaches great attention torecycling and treatment of the waste electronic products,drawing lessons from successfulexperiences of developed countries and through legislation,pilot recycling practice in order to find asuitable path for China’s national conditions of e-waste recycling.But due to our country’s specialconditions,such as economy,technology,culture,the performance of recycling and treatment forwaste electronic products is not ideal.Therefore,it is necessary to rasearch on recycling andtreatment of the waste electronic products,and then provide suggestions for the government,therecyclers and processors.So,in this paper,on the base of predecessors’ research results,with identifythe key issues to establish the mathematical model.Firstly,established a duopoly game model between the processors.With the introduction oftechnological innovation factors,from the static game to dynamic game,analyzed the change processof competitive advantage.And through the numerical simulation research the effects of technologyoverflow ratio and recycling coefficient of competition on processors pricing decisions. The resultsshow that it could increase the recycling price and quantity with the technological innovation.wheth-er the processor through technological innovation can obtain competitive advantage or not dependson the technological spillovers rate.The higher the technological spillovers rate,the recycling priceand quantity is more higher,so it can achieve a higher social benefit,but this will receive rejectionfrom the innovation practitioner.Secondly,the duopoly game model were extended to the double chain competition situation.Analyzed the reverse supply chain under symmetric information Stackelberg game with fourdecision-making structure: the structures of Decentralization-Decentralization,Decentralization-Int-egration,Integration-Decentralization,Integration-Integration.The results show that centralizeddecision-making is its dominant strategy for the leaders of reverse supply chain;For followers ofreverse supply chain,adopting the centralized decision or decentralized decision,not only dependson the selection of leaders of reverse supply chain, but also by recycling coefficient of competitionand the influence of the reverse supply chain cost and benefit of leader and follower.Finally,discussed the effects of information asymmetry on the decision choose of the two reversesupply chain.The results show that when the competitive is low between the two reverse supply chain,CC mode is the game equilibrium;When more intense competition between the two reversesupply chain,the game equilibrium strategy depends on the leader’s cost prediction of the follower’ssupply chain and the size of the recovery coefficient of competition.