Faced with fierce competition, companies chose outsourcing of unimportant business to reduce the cost of equipment maintenance, improve the level of equipment maintenance and management, thus enhancing the competitiveness of enterprises. In this context, the third-party maintenance services companies have been developing rapidly. However, it is existence of the agency relationship between the third-party equipment maintenance companies and the outsourcing enterprises of equipment maintenance with the equipment maintenance of outsourcing business. Members of the supply chain nodes is an independent business, their decision-making and information is dispersed, and as the basis for all decisions in order to maximize profits, and to develop their own optimal decision parameters, this has led to the overall poor performance of the supply chain. Especially in order to maximize corporate profits, the third-party maintenance companies as an agent often have the advantage of information to make decision which will damage profit of the whole supply chain.This article will research the third-party maintenance services with serve pricing theory, agency theory, game theory and contract theory, while consider the cost, demand factors, quality of service levels, industry evaluation and the response speed of the fault in maintenance outsourcing model. The article will research the strategy how to study contract parameters by coordinating design to encourage the supply chain members to make the best decisions in the supply chain, avoid triggering moral hazard problems and to ensure the interests of the whole supply chain.Thesis analyzes the decentralized decision-making under symmetric information, the centralized decision-making and the optimal decision under asymmetric information between the third-party maintenance services business and enterprises of outsourcing service and then gives a numerical example under conditions of decentralization and centralization, and finally respectively does comparative static analysis about the decision factors. Studies have shown that, in the supply chain under symmetric information, the maintenance outsourcing companies and third-party equipment maintenance business independently decentralized decision-making, profit and the profit system as a whole are lower than the profits of both centralized decision-making, the decentralized decision-making under symmetric information will lead to lower overall performance can’t be achieved coordinated supply chain. The establishment of service outsourcing enterprises revenue sharing contract under symmetric information model by design contract parameters to achieve the third-party equipment maintenance service provider’s effective incentives, can make the best overall performance of the supply chain. In addition, through the establishment of sharing contract of the revenue model under asymmetric information model to research the quality of third-party maintenance services pricing and investment strategies of service level for optimal profits, to achieve supply chain coordination under asymmetric information. |