Research On Coordination Mechanism And Outsourcing Strategy For Supply Chain Based On Game Theory

Due to economic globalization,Proliferation of customer demand and technological progress,effective coordination plays an important role in the successful operation of supply chain. Today supply chain often consists of stages with different owners. Each stages of a supply chain may have conflict objectives,as a result,each stage tries to maximize its own profits,resulting in actions that often diminish total supply chain profits. Therefore, effective coordination incentive mechanisms should be built to guarantee risk sharing, chain-wide rewards sharing, information sharing and convenient communications among SC members, to reduce total operational cost, thus to improve supply chain's competitive power and system-wide performance.The thesis pursues an in-depth research on supply chain coordination mechanisms, incentive mechanisms and outsourcing mechanisms based on game theory, principle-agent theory, optimal control theory, operations research, and details are as follows:Chapter one introduces the research significance and present situation of supply. Then Chapter Two introduces some basic theories about supply chain coordination so as to provide a theoretical frame work for the following studies.Chapter Three compares three kinds of coordination methods for two stage supply chain. The results show that, enterprises'profit isn't positive correlation with its bargaining capability, their distribution profits are related to their independent decision-making profits and interval range of bargaining capability.The price of logistics service is shared by manufacturer and retailer in Chapter Four. The results show that the cooperation strategy can not only maximize the interests of system, but also benefit the consumers. However, not all members would accept cooperation due to their effort to maximize self-interest. Therefore, it needs to build up an efficient system of interest distribution so as to realize the win-win goal to maximize the member interests and system interests. On the other hand, avoiding to divarication for choosing different coordination methods, we need build up a comprehensive coordination strategy in order to get all-win and all-satisfaction.At present, retailer proposes rich marketing channel for manufacturer, but the unfairness is appeared, such as the cost from manufacturer to retailer is paid by manufacturer completely. Firstly, when manufacturer is core enterprise, Chapter Four finds the loading ratio of service price for retailer is larger, enterprises'profit are all improved, and decision maker can make outsourcing decisions by loading ratio under non-cooperative game.Secondly, forward and reverse logistics service price are introduced to three-stage CLSC system in Chapter Five when third party logistics service provider is core enterprise, RT-CLSC and MT-CLSC model are constructed under double effects of logistics outsourcing and products recovery, Forward and reverse logistics outsourcing's critical Conditions are proposed for supply chain enterprise. Critical Conditions of recovery by manufacturer or recovery by retailer was put forward through different logistics states.,and we analyzed manufacturer's decision is related with logistics service cost and recovery cost of retailer.Chapter Six deals with the incentive problem of third party logistics service provider, we find the outsourcer's integrative devotion level and the third party logistics service provider's efforts level have effect on output. Results show, the outsourcer's integrative devotion level is a important variable, it not only influences the output, but also has obvious effect on he third party service logistics provider's efforts. In view of four types of risk preference combinations of outsourcer and third party logistics service provider, research shows outsourcer's risk preference is constrained by third party logistics service provider's risk preference.