Contract Design For Sustainable Supply Chains Under Information Asymmetry

In the context of green emission reduction production,greenhouse gas emissions have attracted increasing attention.The government has introduced carbon emission policies,set up carbon trading markets,and regulated and supervised corporate carbon emissions.Carbon emission information is the private information of supply chain enterprises,and there is information asymmetry,which affects the performance of supply chain.Therefore,this thesis studies the decision-making of manufacturers and retailers under the information asymmetry of emission reduction level,the decision-making of suppliers and manufacturers under the information asymmetry of intermediate product greenness,analyzes the performance of supply chain,and focuses on the coordination effect of different contract design on information asymmetry.(1)For a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer,due to information asymmetry,the manufacturer has a moral hazard in the input of emission reduction level,while the government determines the penalty or not by detecting the product emission reduction standard claimed by the retailer.The influence of the manufacturer ’s moral hazard probability and the government ’s punishment on the emission reduction level and profit of upstream and downstream enterprises is studied.It is concluded that when the government punishment only acts on the retailer,the manufacturer must have the motivation of moral hazard behavior.The higher the probability of moral hazard,the greater the loss of the retailer ’s expected profit.Therefore,this thesis studies the retailer ’s linear incentive contract design and external loss sharing contract design to resolve the possible losses caused by moral hazard and realize the Pareto improvement of retailer ’s profit.(2)For a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two types of suppliers,considering the information asymmetry of intermediate product green degree and the difference of carbon emissions,we discuss how to design the procurement contract in the carbon emissions trading market.It is concluded that in the market with only sustainable product demand,the green disclosure contract can effectively identify different types of suppliers and achieve Pareto improvement of manufacturers ’ profits,while the two-part pricing contract cannot identify different suppliers.In the market where ordinary products and sustainable products coexist,the separation equilibrium contract and the mixed equilibrium contract are analyzed.It is concluded that within the scope of application of the separation equilibrium contract,the manufacturer designs the separation equilibrium contract to obtain higher profits,so the manufacturer prefers the separation equilibrium contract.