Research On Contracts Design Of Call Center Outsourcing Based On Effort Level As Uncontractible Factor

Nowadays, as a new form of industrial organization, service outsourcing has become the main driving force of the second economic globalization. The company can gain many benefits through outsourcing its service to specialized outsourcers, such as saving company costs, strengthening the core competitiveness, obtaining business growth, enhancing the innovation ability, improving customer satisfaction and quick response ability. It gives the company necessary flexibility to deal with the rapidly changing environment and it also makes the organization concentrate on the core competition ability of the organization to gain greater competitive advantage in the fierce competitive market.In the service outsourcing, the contract providers and outsourcers identify their relationship through contract, but the contract is incomplete. How to conduct effective incentive and restraint on the contracting parties to improve the service performance has become a research focus. Call center outsourcing is selected as the research object to study the contract design and coordination based on effort level as the incomplete contract factor.A revenue sharing contract and a combination contract are proposed in this paper to solve the contracts design. Game theory is used to solve the optimal decisions of these two contracts in the simultaneous game and sequential game. This paper also explores the influence of contract parameters on contracts equilibrium. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the conclusions.