Innovation Research About Land Expropriation Compensation System From The Prospective Of The Game Between The Side Of Land Requisition And Land Delivery

Land requisition compensation problem has become one of the hot issue studied by current academic circle since the current land expropriation system caused a series of serious social problems such as the waste of land resources, severely damaged farmers’rights and interests, and finally affected the long-term health of the economic society and its sustainable and stable development in our country. Based on the research about policies and behavior between the side of land requisition and land delivery in the process of land expropriation compensation in our country, the thesis first briefly describes the change context of land expropriation compensation system in China under the game in the subjects of main interests, then conduct the theoretical analysis and empirical research about the behavior of the two sides in the process of land expropriation compensation in the application of game theory, and put forward some suggestions about the innovation of land expropriation compensation system on the basis of game analysis combined with the theory of public management. The article is divided into seven parts. The first part is the introduction in which the study motive, and innovation and deficiency is pointed out. The second part introduces the related theory of land expropriation compensation, game and institutional change. The third part reviews the literature of the land requisition compensation and land expropriation game. The fourth part explains the land compensation institutional change and institutional innovation of our country, then comparatively analyze the land expropriation compensation system of developed countries and regions. We can conclude that it is important to point out the significant role of the game of the subjects of main interests in promoting the change of land expropriation compensation system in China through the above analysis. The fifth part analyzes game behavior between the side of land requisition and land delivery with a simplified game model in the process of land expropriation and requisition. The sixth part put the SH highway JC period of land expropriation as instance to analyze the game behavior and motives of basic-level government and farmers in land requisition. The seventh part is the conclusion and suggestion part. First of all, it is concluded that the existing land expropriation compensation system leads the high cost of land transactions, and intervention of the government public power in land expropriation process distorts the game result, causing social welfare loss. Finally, put forward concrete suggestions of innovation in land expropriation compensation system of our country under the guidance of the new public management concept:standardize the game behavior of government in land expropriation behavior under the condition of the existing system; the government should quit from the land expropriation game after improving institutional environment.