Study On Matching Mechanism Of Public Rental Housing Based On Two-sided Matching Theory

Since Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development issued "Notice of public rental housing and low rent housing system operation", and the local governments practice, public rental housing jumped to the main body of affordable housing. Public rental housing four areas:construction, allocation, management, exit. With a large number of public rental housing have built, the question that comes along is how to allocate. Although the government has done a lot of work in the allocation of public rental, there are still some problems, which have public housing application access rigor, material authenticity audit, the rationality of rent subsidies, lottery sort of randomness, exit mechanism of the integrity. In this article, it only focus on the matching problem of public housing waiting with vacancy houses, which is refers to how to allocate public rental housing to applicants that through the recheck efficiently and fair.Allocation market of vacant public rental housing, which is two-sided market, includes public rental housing and the waiting list. Based on the guidance of "Public rental housing management approach" combining with local facts, China’s provinces and cities use available a lottery and comprehensive scoring in order to obtain the sequence of waiting room. But the two methods are both from the government perspective, reflected the public housing suppliers’ preferences, and less with or without considering the demand preference of the waiting, which makes the overall utility of government and waiting lower. Therefore, in view of reference of application of two-sided matching theory in marriage matching, school enrollment, choice of jobs, etc, this paper intends to apply two-sided matching theory in the allocation of public rental housing market.In the article, first, through the analysis of public rental housing allocation of Beijing, Chongqing, Guangzhou and other places combined of Wuhan’s specific allocation of public rental process, it comes to the allocation of public rental that does not take into account the needs of the waiting list preference. Secondly, declare the development and application of two-sided matching based on cooperative game theory, describes several typical matching mechanism of housing, and reach the theoretical basis the application of two-sided matching in allocation of public rental. Again, elaborated the new idea of public housing allocation, according to the actual situation of public rental housing allocation, use more mature two-sided matching algorithm, consider each other’s preferences for public rental housing and the waiting list, base on the evaluation of various forms of information, establish multi-objective linear optimization model to make maximize satisfaction of two-sided evaluation, and then transformed into a single objective linear programming to obtain the right match. Finally, examples of analysis techniques that two-sided matching method is feasible in the allocation of public rental, which provides a theoretical basis and practical methods for the rational allocation of public rental.