Equitable Allocation Of Public Rental Housing Based On The Stable Matching Theory

Public rental housing as an affordable housing construction, it has received extensive attention since being proposed, now has become an important component of the housing security system. Public rental housing is a social welfare resources, it is a bilateral market that composed by the public rental housing and the applicants. Government allocated housing based on the applicant household income, poverty levels and other judgments. For the allocation of this welfare resources, the price mechanism can not fully play its role, so how to protect their equitable allocation became difficult. In public rental housing allocation process, there are many drawbacks, loose application process audit, access threshold setting is not clear, lack of impartiality with rent while waiting for an object sorting, housing matching mechanism is immature, exit mechanisms are inadequate, unreasonable rental pricing and other issues, are all restricting achieve a fair distribution of public rental housing. This article is mainly research the rent distribution of the allocation, analysis focused on the existing matching mechanisms, discusses its existence issues, and use the bilateral matching model and the G-S algorithm in the stable matching theory to make an improvement, to seek a new matching mechanism, trying to promote the fairness of allocation in some extent.This paper analyzes the problems of current allocation of public rental areas in the various aspects and focus on the part of the rent matching, pointing out that the existing matching process, mostly based on the government’s allocation of unilateral decisions,the waiting people are often unable to fully express their preferences and their preference information may not be fully, it makes people who most in need of public rental housing has not been assigned, or allocated to the most appropriate listings in the hands of others, which led to allocation of public rental demand dislocation, waste of resources, unfair distribution. Secondly, This paper describes the meaning of fair and equitable distribution, and from different angles to determine whether it is a fair distribution, in the field of public rental housing distribution is selected for the equitable allocation "from envy" criteria. Thirdly, in order to promote fair allocation of public rental housing, this paper aim to the part of the matching period, and proposes an improvement program that applied the stable matching theory to the allocation of public rental housing. In the stable matching theory, two matching sides fully express their true mutual preference, as long as the market is free and the preference is true, it can always reach an effective stabilizing matching. Based on this theory, in the market that constituted by the public rental housing and the applicants, both parties to fully express the true preferences, after matched getting a stable matching results, and the matching is Pareto optimal, which can meet the fairness and efficiency. Finally, this paper through experiments to verify this improved method, comparing the results of allocation of the matching mechanism in the traditional distribution system and the improved G-S algorithm matching mechanism, evaluated from both equity and efficiency indicators, verified the feasibility and advantages of this matching method.