A Study On The Behavior Of The Grain Storage’s Subjects Based On The Game Theory

Food reserves as necessary convergence between food production and consumption sectors, play an important role in ensuring food security. As the main subject of China’s grain reserves, farmers and local grain enterprises driven by self-interest are often operate in reverse and thus seriously affecting the effects of national grain reserve macro-control policy. Therefore, systematic study of the main subject’s behavioral characteristics, the decision basis and its root cause and countermeasures of "reverse operation" behavior, is important to avoid the reverse operation of its behavior, guide and encourage them to actively cooperate with the national macro-control policies and to protect the China’s grain security.Starting from the perspective of game theory, this paper makes depth analysis of the Central Grain Reserves Corporation which is under the administration of Central Government, the state-owned grain enterprises which is established by local governments and the decentralized farmers, and build the Evolutionary Game Model of Bounded Rationality between farmers, Dynamic Game Model between the local government and farmers and the Complete information static model, Complete information dynamic model and Mixed strategy game model under the perspective that grain enterprises act as the buyer and the seller of the grain market. The results show that:For farmers, their grain storage behaviors have a great imitation and convergence characteristics, and individual farmers can be affected easily by other farmers’ action; and farmers irrational expectations of future food prices is an important reason their behavior reverse operation. Government should guide farmers to form rational expectations about the future food prices and through subsidies affect income levels of farmers and ultimately affect their decisions, and make farmer take active grain reserves become their optimal choice under the rational decision.For the main grain storage enterprises, the paper deduces mathematical relationships between their income and their acquisition volume and the other grain enterprises’ acquisition volume, proves that their reverse operation behavior is the inevitable result of the pursuit of maximization profit goals. When the food prices is higher, compared with making decisions at the same time, the Central Reserve acts as a leader to make decisions, to affect other grain enterprises’ market expectations will have a better control effect. Therefore, the state should encourage the China Grain Reserves Corporation to play the role of "leader" to influence grain enterprises’expectation. When the food prices is lower, the game without outside intervention will ultimately lead to reduce the effects of policy control of food reserves and even be contrary to the regulatory goals. Therefore, the state should introduce the policy subsidies to influence the game’s proceeds and coordinate the conflict between their interests goals and policy objectives, and make the implementation of grain storage policy become the optimal choice under their maximization interests goals, fundamentally circumvent the reverse operation of grain enterprises.This article’s innovation is that it makes systematic study of the behavior of grain reserves’ subject from the perspective of game theory for the first time and it has depth study of the principles of economics about the reverse operation of the farmers and grain storage business, besides, it uses methods of mathematical economics to derive and prove the revenue function. Therefore this paper makes the game’s analysis process and conclusions more objectively and rationality.