The Analysis Of Chinese Medical Security Institutional Change Based On The Evolution Game Theory

With the system analysis to the main line, this study is based on Chinese medicalsecurity system and analysis China’s medical security system origin and evolution reasonfrom the historical perspective of interpretive by using evolutionary game theory andparadigm. This paper established new understanding about the causes and changingprocess of the medical security system, undertook forecasting on the future of medicalsecurity system development trend and offer policy proposal.It needs to be emphasized that this paper adopts the institutional view of gameequilibrium and the medical security system be defined as “A summary representation(information concentration) spontaneous format in individual or group of interest in theinteraction process. It provides an internalized norm of behavior and cognitive template forpeople. Its purpose is to guard from the dilemma of collective action by individual reasonleads to and maintain social stability.” That is to say the medical security system is aninformation concentration of people involved in the game process about how "The socialmedical assistance","The social insurance","The supplementary medical insurance" and"commercial medical insurance" be arranged. Thus the medical security system differs fromthe medical security policy and some policy is a kind of expression about system.The medical group and the patient group be assumed to the limited rationalityhypothesis in this game and each of them has own Subjective game model. Thegovernment is a kind of exogenous game parameters. In different domains and domaincoupling condition, Participants have different choice.The author considers that the medical security system is a result of social exchangedomain intervented to doctor-patient exchange domain and is inevitable. In this study, the change course of medical security system be divided into four parts:" Home security","Collective security"," Self protection" and" Mixed security". They are the result of jointaction about synchronic association and diachronic association and have obviouspath-dependent nature. In the Change course of our medical security system, thegovernment can affect the player’s information structure or their ability to get informationthrough policy and regulations and finally play a decisive role in medical insurance systemchanges. Because of imitation and learning mechanism, the player’s subjective gamemodel is changing and they always pursue the external profit potential. So the medicalsecurity system is constantly changing, and along the equilibrium evolution.