The reports of the Seventeenth Congress of the CPC proposed the request of "deepening the reform of the income distribution system", and while the executive pay system of the stated-owned enterprises (SOEs), as the main part of the country's income distribution system, its reform has been put agenda naturally. In recent years, along with the events of Guotai Junan's "3.2 billion high pay" and the "paid to limit" of the state-owned assets supervision and the other related departments, the reform issue of the executive pay system of the state-owned enterprises has become the public focus again. However, for a long time, because of the reform path, reform goal and the other reasons, the reform of the executive pay system of the state-owned enterprises is still hanging back, and still can not hit the requests of market, individuation and precision, so in the background of the reform of the state-owned enterprises moving, choose a reform path, which can adjust well the actual conditions well, and select a reform pattern both with high incentive effect and strongly constraint utility are imminent.According to the above questions, this essay takes the reform path and pattern choice of the executive pay system of the state-owned enterprises as the core, and through the deep analysis and discussion of the main problems and the behind reasons of the present executive pay system of the state-owned enterprises, makes clear the reform path, and in the following, based on this reform path, draws the final conclusions that the combination of the annual salary system and operator holding can be the best choice of the existing executive pay system of the state-owned enterprises. This essay belongs to an inter-disciplinary theory study, integrating the theory knowledge of management, institutional economics, personnel management economics and the other related disciplines, and takes the standardize research and comparison research as the main researching methods.The contents of this essay are composed of six parts:The first part is the introduction, and it mainly introduces the research significance, research methods and main contents. The second part is the reviews of the related research, which include the definitions of the relevant concepts of the executive system of the state-owned enterprises, the theory foundation, and the present situation of the research at home and abroad.The third part proposes the main problems existing in the current executive system of the state-owned enterprises, and behind reasons are analyzed.The fourth part firstly discusses the decision mechanism of the executive pay system of the state-owned enterprises, and then combining with the content of the third part, puts forward the reform orientation, which lays a good foundation of the next part.The fifth part mainly discusses the related issues of the pattern choice of the executive pay system, including the structure and level of the annual salary system, the comparison between the stock options and the operator shareholding, the final pattern selection of the executive pay system, and point out the problems which should be taken into consideration in the process of carrying out.The sixth part mainly makes a conclusion and sum of the whole essay in order to highlight the emphasis and innovation points, and puts forward the limitations and prospect of the research.Although this essay is a theoretical study, it also has strong practical significance in the background of the reform of the state-owned enterprises moving, so expect that the combination mode of annual salary system and the operator shareholding can provide some suggestions and references for the practice. |