Study On Coordinated Quality Control In Supply Chain Based On Inspection And Certification Regime

The circumstance has changed a lot to corporations in 21st century and quality as a key aspect has been increasing important. Improving the product quality is one of purposes of supply chain management. Constructing a high-efficiency supply chain is to decrease the necessary resource and develop new products more rapidly and improve the product quality, and create the corporation's brand. In order to ensure the supply chain run more economic and more efficiently and satisfy the customers demand, it necessary to manage and control the quality of product and service. The key to implement coordination in the quality management in supply chain is to carry out income share and make the partners rely on each other. This paper emphases inspection and certification regimes, considering different information levels, and model the quality income in supply chain. The product quality is improved during the process of modeling and solving the model. Further, the income distributing problem is considered.The main work concludes following three points:First, when buyer inspects the product provided by supplier, different information levels are considered. When the quality information is symmetry, the quality income models of buyer and supplier are set up, and the decision-making according to supply chain's optimization or the partner's optimization is discussed. And then three contracts are designed to coordinate the income's distribution. When there is/are asymmetry information, the models of principal-agent are set up in different information levels, and the product quality improvement is considered. In the process, the income distribution problem is analyzed to guarantee the feasibility of the coordination quality improvement.Second, when supplier gets the product's quality certification, the principal-agent models are set up considering two circumstances:the supplier win high-certification or low-certification. If supplier wins the high-certification, the buyer pays for all products without any penalty. If supplier wins the low-certification, the buyer inspects the product. The models are solved and the income distribution problem is analyzed.Third, the expect incomes in inspection regime and certification regime are compared, and the agent cost is emphasized to analyze the buyer's partial to choose inspection regime or certification regime.