Research On Supply Chain Quality Decision And Incentive Under Supplier Evasion Of A Buyer's Inspection

The quality of products and services provided by the upstream enterprises is a concerned focus of the downstream enterprises.The statistical analysis shows that 20%-30% of product quality defects is caused by the poor quality of suppliers.Moreover,the existence of structural defects,such as asymmetric information,double marginal effect and unstable cooperative relationship among upstream and downstream enterprises,makes it difficult for upstream enterprises to grasp true and effective quality information of suppliers,and cannot curb opportunistic behavior by supplier's pursuiting of shortterm interests.Therefore,it is of great importance to motivate suppliers to improve quality,and maintain long-term and stable cooperation in supply chain.This paper is the first in the supply chain management literature to m odel a supplier's effort to hide information during a buyer's audit,based on a two-stage supply chain model with a single supplier and a single buyer.Around the main questions,this dissertation is divided into three parts.Firstly,discussing optimal quality strategies of the Members on Supply Chain,considering incentive to hide information during a buyer's audit and not.Through further comparative analysis,we can conclude that supplier's effort to hide information during a buyer's audit prompts lower level of effort to improve quality.Secondly,make a deep study on the Incentive Effect of quality inspection level,quality loss cost,profit space of the supplier and pre-play move of the buy.The results show that: contrary to the traditional view,when suppliers are likely to pass audits by hiding information,improving quality inspection level,expanding supplier's profit and increasing quality loss cost of buyer will play a counterproductive role to reduce the supplier's quality effort.On the basis of existing research,this paper model a supplier's effort to hide information during a buyer's audit,based on a two-stage supply chain model with a single supplier and a single buyer.With respect to traditional research,the model is more practical,and the results of the study have reference and promotion significance.Furthermore,expanding the relationship between supplier behavior and supply chain quality management.