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The Behavior Of Rent-Seeking In The Government Procurement Of Our Country And How To Prevent

Posted on:2009-07-04Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:B BaiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360272463706Subject:Administrative Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Regardless of the developed country or the developing country, the behavior of rent-seeking generally exists. The behavior of rent-seeking is a non-productive one of the economic gambling, leading to the waste of social resources, repression of fair competitions, refusal of system creation, and resistance of social civilization. As the main way of using public fund, the government procurement play important roles in many respects, including adjustment of economic operation, optimizing industrial structure, protection of national industry, saving administrative cost and improving the utilization rate of financial fund. Because of the unique attributes, the government procurement causes the rent-seeking activity frequently. The behavior of rent-seeking in the government procurement leads to the waste of social resource , the loss of national wealth, the market competition in a state of chaos, the damage of government honor and image. Therefore, the study of reasons of rent-seeking and how to restrain the activity in this area has very important theory meaning and realistic function. This function embodies in the area of completing the system of our government procurement, reinforcing the management of public fund and promoting the reform of finance system.This paper adopts standardized analysis, empirical analysis and qualitative analysis to analyze the manifestations and causes of rent-seeking. The dynamic game model is used to analyze the behavior of rent-seeking in the government procurement of our country, leading to the analysis more standardized and deeply.This paper starts with the meaning of rent-seeking and government procurement and proceeds with an detailed analysis on the present situation of the government procurement and the behavior of rent-seeking. Finally, suggestions reached to resolve the problem of rent-seeking. There are six parts in the paper. Chapter one described the content of rent-seeking, the content and functions of government procurement and the present situation of the government procurement in our county. Chapter tow analyzes the performances of the behavior of rent-seeking in the government procurement of our county. Chapter three discusses the subjective and objection reasons of the behavior of rent-seeking in government procurement of our county. Chapter four uses the dynamic game model to analyze the behavior of rent-seeking in the government procurement of our county deeply. Chapter five emphasizes the impact. Chapter six proposed many feasible suggestions with the conclusions of chapter three and chapter four, including the perfection and innovation of the government procurement system, strengthening the construction of administrative ethics.Through the research of this paper, we can find that the rent-seeking exists in all aspects of the government procurement. And the behavior of the rent-seeking in government procurement is caused by the imperfection of laws and regulations about the government procurement, the unsoundness of the monitoring mechanism and the bidding mechanism, unscientific of financial management, the power operated by the government procurement official irrationally and illegally, the malpractices of the agency by agreement mechanism, driven by interests. The analysis conclusion of the dynamic game model show that the rate which the government procurement staff choose the rent-seeking is related to the supervision cost, the fine of the government to the government staff and suppliers, the wages and bonuses of purchasing personnel. Therefore, this paper put forward some suggestions to prevent the rent-seeking in the government procurement, including strengthening legislation about the government procurement, establishing comprehensive monitoring system, strengthening budget management, standardizing the supply management, improving the punishment, optimizing the incentive mechanisms, the establishment of the rent-dissipation mechanism, strengthening the construction of administrative ethics .
Keywords/Search Tags:Government procurement, Rent-seeking, Game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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