The Research Of Rent-seeking In Government Procurement Based On Game Theory

The theory of rent-seeking has been a hot topic in the western economic society since the mid 20th century. It is also one of the most challenging subjects in research. The behavior of rent-seeking is a common phenomenon in the market economic and shunting countries. China is transforming from the traditional planned economics to the present market economics. During the transformation, the gradual social economic reform has averted the drastic turmoil in society, while stimulated more space for the corrupt activities of rent-seeking, especially in the sectors interfered by the government. The behavior of rent-seeking in the government procurement is much more rampant than in any other sectors.The behavior of rent-seeking is a non-produce one of the economic grambling, leading to the waste of social resource, repression of fair competitions, refusal of system creation, and resistance of social civilization. Meanwhile, the government procurement is an important method that the state can apply to enhance the fiscal expense management, increase the macro regulation ability and promote the marketization of government consumption. Therefore, it is of both theoretical and practical significance to analyze the problem of rent-seeking in the government procurement and to probe into the methodology of supervising and controlling the behavior of rent-seeking.This paper analyzed the behavior of rent-seeking in government procurement, based on the game theory. Chapter one is a general discussion of the reason for choosing this question. Chapter two introduced the current state of the behavior government procurement in our country as well as the behavior of rent-seeking. Chapter three analyzed the relationship of the government, the buyers for the government and the sellers, based on the game theory. Chapter four educed the solutions advanced through the system creation, supervision mechanism perfection, deeper system reform and tighter moral education. Chapter five provided an expectation of rent-seeking in government procurement.