Research On Rent-Seeking And Its Counter-measures In The Government Procurement

Since the birth of the word "rent-seeking" in 1960 s, "rent-seeking" and its theory were considered to be one of the most intense topic of discussion among the domestic and foreign economists. And it is also difficult to completely eliminate the phenomenon in any economic system. In most countries there are more or less such kind of existence of behavior. Meanwhile, rent-seeking behavior is an unproductive economic activity, it simply transfers economic rent, and for the whole society, it is a "negative sum game", truly harmful. At present, our special conditions lead to rent-seeking behavior in many areas inevitably, of which the most can not being ignored area is government procurement.This paper conducts a qualitative analysis around rent-seeking behavior of government procurement, and establishes three different levels of the game model, In order to get control of government procurement in rent seeking strategies. Firstly, starting from the rent-seeking theory discusses the definition of rent-seeking and the origin of the economic rent. On this basis, combines with a detailed analysis of government procurement in the field of economic connotations related to rent-seeking behavior, and the causes of specific performance aspects and hazards. Secondly, using the game model to analyze the choices of each subject of the government procurement for rent in different situations. Finally, based on the results and the theoretical analysis of government procurement for rent obtains countermeasures, including: improving the reporting system, perfect proposal competition, increase penalties and improve the supervision mechanism, to limit the purchaser’s rights and improve procurement people quality, optimizing incentives, establish and improve government procurement electronically.