Supplier Switching And Inventory Management With Considering Learning Effect

In most real-life situations,learning effect which is widely existed in various manufacturing industries,has important influence on the operation management of the firm.With considering learning effect,this dissertation applies the game theory,optimal control theory and contract theory to investigate the supplier switching and inventory management.The detailed contents are as follows:First,with the cost information of the entrant supplier being asymmetric,this thesis studies the supplier switching model with considering the learning effect of the incumbent supplier.On the basis of a principal-agent framework,this thesis establishes the supplier switching model in which the switching cost depends on the volume of the switching.The objective is to minimize the total buying cost of the buyer through the supplier switching decision.To solve the above optimization problem,firstly,the proposed model is converted into an optimal control problem.Then the optimal supplier switching ratio and the corresponding transfer payment are obtained by virtue of Pontryagin’s maximum principle.Moreover,the impact of the learning effect on the supplier switching decision of the buyer is analyzed.Finally,numerical examples are given to illustrate the solution procedure and the effectiveness of the method.The results suggest that the optimal strategy may be a nonlinear partial switching strategy.Next,with the learning ability information of the entrant supplier being asymmetric,the supplier switching model considering the learning effect of the entrant supplier is investigated,in which the production cost of the entrant supplier decreases as the volume of the switching increases.On the basis of a principal-agent framework,this thesis establishes the supplier switching model and obtain the buyer’s optimal switching strategy.Moreover,the impact of the learning effect of the entrant supplier on the supplier switching decision of the buyer is analyzed.Furthermore,this thesis proposes a revenue sharing contract to compare with the contract on the basis of the principle-agent theory from an ex-ante and an ex-post perspective,respectively.The results show that only if the value of the Mills ratio at point zero is greater than the fixed component of the switching cost,partial switching strategy may occur.By comparing the two contracts,from an ex-ante perspective,the contract on the basis of the principal-agent theory always dominates the one designed based on the revenue sharing contract;From an ex-post perspective,the buyer’s contract choice depends on the learning rate of the entrant supplier.Then,this thesis studies the two-period stochastic inventory management model with considering the supplier’s learning effect,in which the supplier acting as the leader of the Stackelberg game determines production quantity and wholesale price in each period,the retailer being the follower decides ordering quantity and selling price.The second-period production cost decreases as the first-period production quantity increases.The vendor-managed inventory(VMI),retailer-managed inventory(RMI)and centralized decision scenario is considered,and by using backward induction method,the equilibrium solution or the optimal solution in the three scenarios is obtained,respectively.By comparing the proposed inventory management modes,this thesis analyzes the impact of the learning effect on the profit of different members of the supply chain and the whole supply chain.The results show that when the holding cost is relatively lower,the RMI scenario is Pareto dominant over the VMI scenario.Most importantly,with a relatively higher variability,as the uncertainty of the learning ability increases,the double marginalization effect is weakened in the RMI scenario while intensified in the VMI scenario.Finally,this thesis studies the dynamic pricing and inventory management model with considering the supplier’ stochastic learning effect and the presence of strategic consumers.The supplier’s second-period production cost decreases as the first-period production quantity increases.Anticipating the supplier’s cost reduction in the second period may lead to a lower selling price,the consumer decides the purchasing period through the comparison of the surplus in the two periods.The scenario in which the supplier may or may not hold the inventory carryover strategy is studied,respectively.The equilibrium solution in the two scenarios is obtained,respectively.The results show that only the supplier with a higher discount rate may have the possibility to hold inventory.The increasing of the learning rate uncertainty and the increasing patience level when the consumer’s patience degree is relatively higher will induce the supplier to excise the inventory carryover strategy.