The Decision Analysis And Contract Design Of Manufacturers Stimulating Supplier Innovation

Supplier innovation plays an important role in the fields of electronics,biopharmaceutical and automobile manufacturing industry development,and can promote the development of products and supply chain.On one hand,with the development of social economics,consumers have strictly demands on the product quality level,even the quality level of key parts and components.So promoting supplier innovation can meet the demand of consumers on quality level after product segmentation.On the other hand,consumers still like "cheap" products,while the cost of product raw materials and key components lead to a higher production,such as the battery cost of electric vehicles accounted for more than half of the cost of electric vehicles,so motivating suppliers to innovate to reduce production costs can satisfy consumers on the product prices.However,suppliers are reluctant to innovate as they are so sensitive to the prior cost they pay to innovate and manufacturers get all the benefits of innovation.For manufacturers,they can ues the result of supplier innovation to improve product quality level at alower research and development cost,so it is necessary to study how to motivate supplier innovation.At present,suppliers and manufacturers face more and more intense horizontal competition,product innovation in the competitive environment can occupy the leading position in the product market,so it is worth analyzing the decision of the supply chain members under the competitive situation.In view of this,this paper,on the basis of field investigation and comprehensive literature,explores the influence of manufacturer’s cooperation behavior,technology licensing behavior and contract selection on supplier innovation decision.Specifically,the conclusion of this research includes the following aspects:(1)In the structure of a single supply chain,considering the marketing efforts of the manufacturer and the innovation ability of the suppliers,the author designs three kinds of contract for the manufacturer’s to spire his supplier to innovate,analyzing the influence of the contract form,the effect of marketing effort and the innovation effect on the decision of the supply chain member.The research shows that the innovation effect is the intrinsic impetus of the manufacturer to encourage the supplier innovation,and the marketing effort effect has promoted the development of the innovation activity to some extent.Because of the combination of innovation effect and marketing effort effect,the manufacturer can obtain the highest profit under the quality wholesale price contract,while the supplier innovation level is lowest even lower than the wholesale contract.The cost-sharing contract can effectively motivate the supplier to innovate and the manufacturer get the optimal benefit at the same time.(2)Under the circumstance of manufacturer competition,the paper analyzes the influence of cost sharing contract on the innovation decision of shared supplier under the cooperation and competition behaviors of manufacturer.The research shows that when the market is less competitive,the cost-sharing ratio of the manufacturer’s cooperation is higher than that of the manufacturer,and the supplier’s innovation level and the manufacturer’s profit are higher than that of the non-cooperative;When the market is more competitive,the cost-sharing ratio of the manufacturer’s cooperation is lower than that of the manufacturer non-cooperating,and the supplier’s innovation level and the manufacturer’s profit are still higher than the manufacturer’s non-cooperative situation;Finally,the manufacturer’s cooperative behavior reduces the negative impact of market competition on the game between the manufacturer and the supplier.(3)Under the competitive environment of the manufacturer,when the downstream manufacturer has the competiting technology,the influence of the technology license contract on the innovation investment of the supplier is considered.By establishing the model of supplier innovation investment decision under the license of manufacturer,this paper discusses the decision behavior of manufacturer’s technology decision and supplier’s innovation investment.The research shows that technology license is helpful to the improvement of technological level,supplier and manufacturer’s profit,meanwhile,the enthusiasm of the supplier to innovate investment is also relatively high under the manufacturer’s technology licensing behavior.By comparing the two technical license contracts,we find that the fixed patent fee contract has no effect on the profit of the supplier,while under the unit patent expense contract,the supplier profit increases with the unit patent expense increase.(4)This paper constructs a model of contract selection for manufacturers to motivate suppliers to innovate under the situation of supplier collusion and competition.The research shows that,no matter whethe the supplier collusion or competition,the cost-sharing contract is optimal than the wholesale price contract,which can realize the manufacturer and the supplier "win-win " situation;Second,the supplier collusion behavior reduces the supplier’s innovation effort to some extent,but when the innovation cost is high,the supplier collusion behavior is advantageous to the supplier innovation activity;Finally,the supplier competition promotes the supplier innovation activity,and the manufacturer should use "the catfish effect" of the supplier competition to promote the innovation activity the development.