A Study On Investment Models And Strategies Of Green Technology For Manufacturing Enterprises Under Carbon Cap-and-Trade Policy

The global climate change caused by the excessive emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases poses a serious threat and challenge to human survival and development.The extensive production practices of enterprises are one of the major causes of excessive carbon dioxide emissions.To address global climate change,governments around the world have enacted a series of environmental policies to control enterprise carbon dioxide emissions,among which cap-and-trade policy based on market mechanisms has become the important mean to constrain enterprise carbon dioxide emissions.Meanwhile,consumer awareness of environmental protection is gradually increasing,and they are more inclined to purchase green products.Under pressure from both governments and consumers for environmental protection,manufacturing enterprises have increasingly recognized the importance of low-carbon development and have introduced green technologies at various stages of the product life cycle.However,investing in green technologies not only requires significant resources such as human,cost,and time,but is also affected by internal and external factors such as enterprise investment efficiency,market competition,technology spillovers,and other enterprise decision-making behaviors.Therefore,under the carbon cap-and-trade policy,whether or not to invest in green technology becomes a major challenge for manufacturing enterprises to make green operation decisions.Although scholars at home and abroad have conducted extensive research on green operations management issues of enterprises,there is still a lack of dynamic two-period studies that consider government carbon policies and individual enterprise green technology investment,as well as integrated research on carbon cap-and-trade policy and horizontal technology spillovers,and integrated research on horizontal technology spillovers and vertical altruistic preference behaviors in competing supply chains.Therefore,the study of manufacturing enterprises’ green technology investment strategies under the carbon cap-and-trade policy has important practical significance and theoretical value.Based on this,this dissertation combines the practical problems and theoretical research progress and limitations of green operation management,and applies game theory and optimal constraint theory to construct a two-period green technology investment model for a single manufacturer under a cap-and-trade policy,a green technology investment model for rival manufacturers considering technology spillover under a cap-and-trade policy,and a green technology investment model for competing supply chains considering both technology spillover and altruistic preference under a capand-trade policy.This dissertation systematically studies the design of government free carbon quota allocation mechanism,analyzes the pricing and production operation decisions of manufacturing firms,discusses the impact of different investment strategies on enterprise profits as well as on consumer surplus and social welfare,and examines the impact of technology spillover and altruistic preference on enterprise profits,consumer surplus and social welfare.The main research and conclusions are as follows:First of all,the two-period green technology investment strategy of a single manufacturer under the cap-and-trade policy is investigated.The study shows that:(1)for the government,the design of initial free carbon allowances is unique and determined by the unit carbon emission trading price;the design of the proportion of free carbon allowances in the second period is not unique and depends on whether manufacturers make green technology investments in the first period.(2)For manufacturers,the choice of investment strategy depends on the trade-off between gains and losses from investing in green technologies,and this trade-off is influenced by the carbon sensitivity of consumers,the unit carbon emission trading price,and the efficiency of the manufacturer’s investment in both periods.(3)The green technology investment strategy ultimately chosen by the manufacturer creates a triple-win situation for the manufacturer,consumers,and society.Secondly,green technology investment strategies of competing manufacturers considering technology spillover under carbon cap-and-trade policy is studied.The study shows that:(1)for the government,the free carbon allowances allocated to two competing manufacturers are positively correlated with the unit carbon emission trading price.When the unit carbon emission trading price in the market is too high,the government should consider relaxing related carbon policies and allocating more free carbon allowances to manufacturers.(2)For the two competing manufacturers,the equilibrium strategies are determined by technological spillover effects,the unit carbon emission trading price,and the related critical threshold.The equilibrium strategies include both manufacturers investing in green technology,only the manufacturer with higher investment efficiency investing in green technology,and neither manufacturer investing in green technology.(3)The equilibrium investment strategies(both manufacturers investing in green technology and only the manufacturer with higher investment efficiency investing in green technology)can increase consumer surplus.Whether they can improve social welfare depends on technological spillover effects.(4)Technological spillover has a positive impact on the manufacturers’ profit,consumer surplus,and social welfare under both manufacturers investing in green technology.Under only one investing manufacturer strategy,technological spillover has a positive impact on consumer surplus,and social welfare,and non-investing manufacturer’s profit,but a negative impact on the investing manufacturer’s profit.Finally,green technology investment strategies of competing supply chains considering technology spillovers and altruistic preferences under a carbon cap-and-trade policy are studied.The study shows that:(1)for the government,the free carbon quota allocated to manufacturers in two competing supply chains is positively related to the unit carbon emission trading price;when the unit carbon trading price in the market is too high,the government should consider relaxing the related carbon policies and allocating more free carbon quotas to manufacturers.(2)For the two competing supply chains,the equilibrium strategy is determined by technology spillover effects,unit carbon emission trading prices,green technology investment cost coefficients,and related thresholds.Dual-chain investment strategies,single-chain investment strategies,and no green technology investment strategies become possible equilibrium strategies.(3)The equilibrium investment strategies(dual-chain investment strategies,single-chain investment strategies)can increase consumer surplus,and whether they can improve social welfare depends on the green technology investment cost coefficient.(4)For the two suppliers,the impact of the manufacturer’s equilibrium strategy on supplier profits is determined by technology spillover effects and unit carbon emission trading price.(5)Technology spillover benefits members’ s profits,consumer surplus,and social welfare under the dual-chain investment strategy.Under the single-chain investment strategy,it benefits consumer surplus,social welfare,and non-investing chain members’ profits,but harms investing chain members’ s profits.Altruistic preferencesbenefit supplier and manufacturer profits,consumer surplus,and social welfare under both strategies.