Emission Reduction Investment And Price Decision Research In Supply Chain On Altruistic Preference

As the cooperation of the supply chain becomes closer and closer,the behavior preference of the members of the supply chain is gradually valued,and scholars begin to explore how people play a role in the operation and coordination of the supply chain.The behavioral preferences of supply chain members,especially altruistic preferences,can influence their decisions and coordinate the supply chain.However,previous studies have focused more on altruistic coefficients,without elaborating altruistic preferences,and less on emission reduction investment in low-carbon supply chains.At present,more and more companies are pursuing low-carbon development.How to consider the altruistic preferences of members of the supply chain on the issue of carbon reduction will bring new challenges to the management of supply chain operations and make the decisions of related companies more complicated.Based on this background,we study the retailer-led secondary supply chain composed of two distinguished manufacturers and one retailer,and consider the altruistic preferences of different members to explore emission reduction investment and price decision issues.In the model of retailers altruistic preference to low-status manufacturers,we consider the impact of supply chain members emission reduction investment on products demand,and characterize the retailer s altruistic preference for low-status manufacturers as relationship preference,status preference and emission reduction concerns.And we build the objective function of maximizing the benefits of supply chain members.First,the equations of manufacturers emission reduction investment,product price expressions and retailers emission reduction investment are solved by reverse induction.Then through theoretical analysis,we can find that the influence of parameters on members decision-making and interests,and there is an optimal solution to retailers investment in emission reduction.We study found that the optimal emission reduction investment of the supply chain members is positively correlated with consumers low carbon preference and their own carbon emission reduction contribution rate,but negatively correlated with the consumer price elasticity coefficient.And the retailer s optimal emission reduction investment increases with their carbon emission reduction technology and its reciprocal of cost rate,while the manufacturers emission reduction investment won t high if its carbon emission reduction technology level increases.An increase in the retailer s reciprocal of cost rate will reduce the manufacturer s optimal emission reduction investment.When retailer s emission reduction investment increases,product prices and profits of manufacturers will increase,but its own utility will increase first and then decrease.The retailer s optimal emission reduction investment increases with its relationship preference and emission reduction concerns,but decreases with status preference.At last,the relationship preference of the retailer is most beneficial to itself,and the relationship preference and emission reduction concern of the retailer are beneficial to the manufacturer.But the position preference reduces the interests of the manufacturer and the retailer.We continue to consider the altruistic preferences of high-status manufacturers in the following chapters.The altruistic preference of high-status manufacturers is divided into horizontal altruism and vertical altruism.Both altruistic preferences are subdivided into relationship preference and status preference.And the objective function of maximizing the benefits of supply chain members is constructed.We found that the two cases were consistent except for the high-status manufacturers utility.By comparing the three models,we found that the altruistic preference of high-status manufacturers will increase the optimal emission reduction investment,the price of products,and the benefits of the members.And the utility of the horizontal altruistic preference model will be greater.In the three decision-making models,the parameters have similar effects on the decision-making and interests of the members.When the value of the altruistic parameter is within a fixed range,the influence of the retailer s relationship preference on the emission reduction investment will be greater,and the influence of the status preference and emission reduction concerns will reduce in the last two models.Therefore,considering the horizontal altruistic preferences of high-status manufacturers is the most beneficial to all members.