Study On The Theory And Application Of Multiple Co-Governance Of Negative Externalities In The Mining Of Ionic Rare Earth

Gannan ionic rare earth is known as the "treasure house of new materials in the future" and "industrial vitamin" and is an indispensable strategic mineral resource for the country’s high-quality development.However,the mining process of ionic rare earth in southern Jiangxi in recent 50 years,whether pool leaching,heap leaching or in-situ leaching,has inevitably caused damage to the natural landscape,groundwater and the safety and health of mining residents,resulting in varying degrees of negative externalities,which restricts the healthy mining of ionic rare earth industry and the pace of ecological civilization construction in the new era.In this context,people can not help but think about that which participants will be involved in the negative externality governance of ionic rare earths in southern Jiangxi,and which party will play a leading role?How to construct the multiple co governance model of negative externalities,and how can this model be applied?What policies and systems can the government introduce to guide the mining of ionic rare earths in southern Jiangxi?Can the multi governance model with negative externalities achieve better results?These are practical questions that need to be answered urgently at present.Guided by the above-mentioned problems,this paper comprehensively sorts out the existing literature on negative externality theory,game theory and stakeholder theory,identifies the main stakeholders in the process of negative externality governance of ionic rare earth development,and proposes a negative externality multi-governance model.According to this model,an evolutionary game model is constructed around the similarities and differences of the interests of each participant,to study the strategy selection under different mechanisms,and to discuss policy recommendations that effectively drive the co-governance of all participants.The main research contents and achievements are as follows:(1)The article analyzes the negative externalities of the development of Gannan ionic rare earth,points out the shortcomings of the unitary governance model,and identifies the main stakeholders in the process of negative externality governance.And put forward the multi-dimensional co-governance theory system with the government as the leading role,the mining enterprise as the main body,application enterprise collaboration,mining residents’ participation and the general public supervision,and further study the multiple participation,dynamic mechanism and synergy mechanism in co-governance.Then,the theoretical application of the multi-governance model is discussed from four aspects:necessity,realization path,game model construction and evolutionary game steps.(2)In the dimensions of application enterprise collaboration,mining residents’ participation and the general public supervision,a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed,and then hypotheses are proposed,replication dynamic equations are constructed,strategy solutions are obtained,numerical simulations are performed,and stable equilibrium points are analyzed.And firstly carry out simulation research on the evolutionary game under the static mechanism,and then introduce the dynamic reward,dynamic punishment,dynamic reward and punishment mechanism,make reasonable optimization and improvement for the variable parameters such as subsidies and punishment values in the original equation,construct the Jacobian matrix.Then,the local stability analysis method is selected to test the influence of different guiding policies on the stable state of each evolutionary equilibrium solution,and analyze the convergence situation to obtain the optimal strategy under different conditions.The research results reflected that:under the static reward and punishment mechanism,the three-party evolutionary game process couldnot appear stable equilibrium,and did not have asymptotic stability.Under the action of three different mechanisms:dynamic reward,dynamic punishment and dynamic reward and punishment,the behavior and strategies of the three parties in the game fluctuate,which would be idealized to a certain extent and have asymptotic stability.The willingness of each participant was slightly different in the three states.Through analysis,it was found that if the government implemented a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism,it woule stimulate a higher degree of recognition of ionic rare earth mining enterprises,and at the same time,it would also achieve a better co-governance effect.(3)Ganzhou Municipal Government,Ganzhou Rare Earth Group Co.,Ltd.,Dingnan Dahua New Material Resources Co.,Ltd.,and Lingbei Rare Earth Mining Area in Dingnan County were selected as the case study objects to investigate the negative externalities of the development of ionic rare earths in this region,and use the constructed three-party evolutionary game model for empirical test.Overall,the case studies in Chapters 4,5 and 6 further verify the reliability of the model construction and the accuracy of the game analysis conclusions.(4)In order to effectively improve the multi governance level of negative externalities in the mining of ionic rare earth,this paper puts forward the following policy suggestions:First,clarify the participation tasks of multiple co-governance,and define the roles of the government,ionic rare earth mining enterprises,application enterprises,mining residents and the general public.Second,to improve the multi-governance model,the core of which lies in multi-participation.It is necessary to clarify the rights,responsibilities and obligations of each participant,scientifically organize and coordinate the activities of each participant,and form a governance network system,so as to realize the efficient coordination of negative externality governance.Third,build a collaborative mechanism for application enterprises,make use of the strong correlation between application enterprises and mining enterprises,and achieve mutual benefit and win-win results for upstream and downstream enterprises by enhancing value and benefit sharing,and realizing the closed-loop operation of negative externality governance of ionic rare earth development.Fourth,innovate the dynamic realization path of multiple co-governance.On the whole,build an incentive mechanism for multiple co-governance with negative externalities in the development of ionic rare earths,including rewards,punishments,assessments,and supervision mechanisms.On the local,in the implementation of negative externality governance,establish and improve the cooperation mechanism of all participants.Reasonably constructing the multi governance model of negative externalities in the mining of ionic rare earths,and identifying the game strategy and willingness of collaborative governance among the participants will reduce the loss of intergenerational externalities and environmental externalities in the mining of ionic rare earths in southern Jiangxi,and improve the confidence of local residents to restore a healthy ecology and create a good atmosphere for economic development.At the same time,the research results of this paper may provide reference for the Ministry of natural resources,the Ministry of industry and information technology,relevant provincial departments and rare earth industry associations in environmental problems,safety and health management decisions caused by the mining of ionic rare earths;standardizing the governance of ionic rare earth mining enterprises in southern Jiangxi,strengthening the sense of responsibility and urging them to exercise the responsibility of mine ecological protection and restoration can also provide some inspiration for the main bodies such as ionic rare earth application enterprises in the governance of negative externalities.