Research On Game And Strategy Of Environmental Remediation Evolution In Ion-Type Rare Earth Mines

Rare earth is an important strategic resource,General Secretary Xi Jinping made important instructions on promoting the green and sustainable development of the rare earth industry.Mining environment restoration is indispensable to realize green and sustainable development.The main source of funds for environmental remediation is mining enterprises,and the remediation policies and systems are mostly limited to enterprises.For environmental restoration with historical problems and strong externalities,most of them rely on unstable financial funds.Policy failure and lack of funds often occur,resulting in environmental damage,ecological imbalance and soil and water pollution problems can not be well solved.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the environmental restoration of ionic rare earth mines.This paper is derived from the National Social Science Foundation Youth Project(13CJY126),Jiangxi Humanities and Social Science Research Project(JJ162005)and Jiangxi Education Department Science and Technology Project(GJJ190455).Based on the main research line of ionic rare earth mine environment restoration,this paper chooses the analytical method of combining theoretical research with empirical research,qualitative analysis with quantitative analysis.After reading the relevant literature,theories and practical cases of ionic rare earth environmental restoration,the behavioral strategies of the relevant subjects are studied.Based on the perspective of interest relationship,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of ionic rare earth environmental restoration,which focuses on the influence factors and behavior strategy selection of stakeholders,leads in actual operation date of mining enterprises in South Jiangxi mining area,makes simulation analysis,and puts forward relevant policy recommendations.The main findings and conclusions are as follows:Firstly,the paper reviewed the domestic and foreign literature on the status of environmental remediation of rare earth mines,the policy of environmental remediation of rare earth mines,and the benefit relations of rare earth mines.On the basis of stakeholder theory,evolutionary game theory,system dynamics and other theories,and combining with related theories and literature research on rare earth mine environmental restoration,this paper analyzed the interest relationship of ionic rare earth environmental restoration.Based on the perspective of stakeholders,this paper discussed the multi-agent benefit distribution in the process of environmental restoration of ionic rare earth mines,the paper redefined the interests of the core stakeholders and the interests of the core stakeholders in the ionic rare earth environmental restoration,and analyzed the influencing factors and the game behavior strategies.Secondly,based on the core stakeholders involved in the environmental restoration of ionic rare earth,the regulatory body of the central government was introduced to establish a tripartite evolutionary game model of the central government,local governments and mining enterprises.The game relations between the central government,the local government and the mining enterprises were deeply analyzed,the stability analysis was carried out according to the behavior strategies of the three parties,and the strategic stability conditions of the three parties was determined.Based on the financial data of environmental restoration in Longnan county mining area,the three-party evolutionary game model was simulated and analyzed in combination with system dynamics,and the influence of various factors on the evolutionary stable state was determined by controlling variables.The analysis showed that the central government and local governments’ support to the ionic rare earth mining enterprises,financial support policies and strong punishment measures were important ways to promote the environmental restoration work,while the environmental remediation cost and the environmental remediation benefit of the mining enterprise determined whether the mining enterprise chooses the environmental remediation strategy voluntarily or not.Thirdly,based on the strategies of central government supervision and local government implementation,the social public was introduced into the game model of local government and mining enterprises,and the three-party evolutionary game model of local government,mining enterprises and the public was constructed.This paper made an in-depth analysis of the game relations between the local governments,mining enterprises and the public,and discussed the influence of the behavior strategies of them on the environmental restoration of ionic rare earth mines.Based on the policy document of Longnan county party committee and the financial data of environmental remediation in Longnan mining area,the influence of various factors on the evolution stability was determined by using the system dynamics simulation model.The analysis showed that increasing the collusion cost between the local government and the rare earth mining enterprises can effectively promote the rare earth mining enterprises to choose high-quality environmental remediation strategies,while the public seldom performs the supervision responsibility of environmental restoration in ionic mines for their own interests and personal safety.Fourth,ionic rare earth mining areas are widely distributed and difficult to concentrate in the same area,and the externality of environmental remediation may lead to the free-rider behavior between adjacent mining areas.The game model of environmental remediation evolution in different mining areas in adjacent areas was constructed,and the strategies of environmental restoration interaction between adjacent mining areas were determined by means of progressive stability analysis.Based on the financial data of environmental restoration in Longnan mining area and Dingnan mining area,the interaction of behavioral strategies between adjacent mining areas was determined by the system dynamics simulation model.The results showed that measures such as reducing the cost of environmental remediation,increasing the profit of environmental restoration and strengthening the supervision of local governments can significantly promote the restoration of ionic rare earth mines environment.Therefore,this paper aimed at the core’ interest bodies like central government,local governments,the mining enterprises and the social public,established the evolutionary game model hierarchically,analyzed the behavior strategy between them,put forward policy suggestions to promote the ionic rare earth mine environmental restoration.The conclusions of this paper enrich and consummate the rare earth industry development environment restoration theory,provide theoretical basis for government policy-making.