Study On Governance Mechanism Of Transboundary Water Pollution In River Basins

In the context of China’s new normal economic development,water environment protection is still an indispensable and important part of our economic and social sustainable development.It is undeniable that the problems of water ecology are still outstanding and have become a common topic of great concern worldwide.The varying degrees of damage to the water environment during the long-term development of human society has aggravated the waste and pollution of water resources.In turn,the destruction of the natural environment has brought great harm to human survival and social development.One of the development dilemmas facing China and many developing countries is the obstacle of "treatment after pollution".How to take practical and effective measures to regulate water pollution prevention and control behaviors in transboundary river basins,to ensure that the water environment of the river basins no longer deteriorate and to gradually restore healthy development,has become the focus of attention of governments at all levels in our country.Through the study of this article,the following theoretical and practical conclusions have been drawn:Firstly,in view of the analysis of China’s river basin transboundary water pollution prevention and control mechanism,a relatively in-depth analysis was carried out on river basin pollution prevention laws and regulations,management institutions,and mechanisms.In our country,the government’s emphasis is the political guarantee for the prevention and control of transboundary water pollution.Since China’s practice in the prevention and control of transboundary water pollution started late,the water pollution control system is not yet perfect.The overall coordination role of the central level appears to be very difficult to deal with the problem of cross-border pollution across the country.The national macro-control mechanism cannot fully reflect the interests and demands of the participants in the river basin,leading to varying degrees of "non-cooperation" between the government and the relevant stakeholders.Secondly,for the study of ecological benefit compensation for transboundary water pollution control in a river basin,a Stackelberg differential game model of pollution discharge and pollution control between the upstream and downstream of the river basin is established,and the proportional compensation mechanism and the investment compensation mechanism are compared and studied.After analyzing the dynamic equation and numerical simulation,it is found that an appropriate ecological compensation ratio will increase the enthusiasm for investment in pollution control in the upstream area.On the contrary,excessive economic compensation from downstream areas to upstream will greatly reduce this enthusiasm,leading to excessive reliance on ecological compensation.The investment compensation mechanism requires higher investment costs and longer time for environmental governance to produce results.For environmental supervision departments,investment compensation is a sustainable mechanism for the treatment of transboundary water pollution in river basins.Thirdly,the study on incentives for green innovation in the treatment of transboundary water pollution in river basins has expanded the types of pollutants in the water area to a variety of types,and studied the mechanism and influencing factors of green innovation subsidies in the treatment of transboundary water pollution.It is found that there is a positive relationship between the investment cost of green innovation and the proportion of innovation subsidies,and the proportion of green innovation subsidies is also affected by the amount of pollutants transferred.There is a chain reaction relationship between the green innovation investment cost,the proportion of pollutants transfer and the proportion of green innovation subsidies,and regulatory policies need to be used to intervene to encourage downstream regions to increase the proportion of green innovation subsidies and form a stable transfer mechanism.For two adjacent regions with transboundary water pollution problems,if cross-regional unified cooperation cannot be achieved,green innovation subsidy incentives are also a good choice that can effectively alleviate regional pollution.At the same time,it is also necessary to increase subsidies for green innovation on the basis of strengthening alliances through administrative means,so that cross-border joint pollution control can exert a real effect.Fourthly,for the study of the tripartite joint model of transboundary water pollution prevention and control in the river basin,the dynamic differential game model of pollution control between the three upstream and downstream regions of the transboundary water pollution was established,and the independent,two-party joint and three-party cooperation differential were discussed.The optimal decision-making problem under the game.Through solving the Nash equilibrium solution and simulation analysis,it is found that during the planning period,from the overall perspective of the basin,as the degree of integration increases,the instantaneous emission rate of pollution in each region of the basin decreases successively,the intensity of pollution control investment increases successively,and the pollutant inventory of the basin changes.There are differences between the upstream and downstream regions.In the long-term steady state,the instantaneous emission rate of tripartite cooperation is lower than the two-party joint model,and the two-party joint is lower than their respective independent modes.The pollution control investment intensity is exactly the opposite,while the pollutant inventory level in the basin is lower than the two-party joint model.In the tripartite cooperation model,the tripartite cooperation is lower than the independent model,that is,the two-party joint model has the lowest pollutant inventory level and the best pollution reduction effect.Transboundary water pollution discharge in the river basin requires the strengthening of alliances and cooperation among all regions to jointly make pollution discharge and investment governance decisions,so as to achieve the purpose of coordinated protection.Lastly,to study the long-term mechanism of transboundary water pollution control in a river basin,establish a differential game model of the technical effects of transboundary water pollution control in a river basin,and take the pollution control investment capital stock into account.By solving the Nash equilibrium solution of each relevant variable,the optimal trajectory curve under the finite level condition and the infinite level condition is simulated and analyzed.The results show that within a limited level,the game participants in the upstream and downstream of the basin adopt individual rational strategies at the end of the planning period.The longer the planning period,the lower the optimal pollutant discharge rate under equilibrium and the lower the pollutant inventory.In the long-term stable state,the investment in pollution control continues to rise,and the optimal equilibrium level in the steady state is higher than the non-cooperative game.During the limited planning period,the existence of individual rationality makes regional governments hesitant,and it is difficult to cooperate with other regions to reduce pollution emissions and achieve collective rationality goals.However,in the long run,repeated mutual games between different regions can prompt stakeholders to take joint actions to maximize the interests of all parties.To sum up,the prevention and control of transboundary water pollution in China’s river basins requires: strengthen the modernization of the overall management organization based on river basins;establish a new cooperation mechanism for the prevention and control of transboundary water pollution in river basins;accelerate the market-oriented construction of transboundary water pollution control in river basins,and expand governance pollution investment and financing channels;improve and deepen the pollution permit system,accelerate the promotion of the pollution rights trading system;strengthen information disclosure and public participation.Continuously raise the ecological civilization construction of the river basin to a new level.