Game Theory Based Strategies Of Joint Prevention And Control For Transboundary Water Pollution

As one of the precious freshwater resources in our country,the lake water system provides the society with important ecosystem services.However,due to extensive economic development model in recent years,the structure and function of many lakes in our country have suffered serious damage.The problem of lake water pollution and eutrophication are very serious,and the issue of transboundary water pollution in lakes is particularly prominent.Pollution disputes caused by transboundary water pollution occur more frequently.Different regions,because of different management mechanisms,traceability of transboundary pollution of lakes facing difficulties,obtaining evidence cannot be permitted because of crossborder law.Besides,transboundary lake water pollution involves multiple interests,collusion between region governments and enterprises occurs easily.Therefore,it is particularly important to set up a comprehensive management mechanism for joint prevention and control of lakes.This paper is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(grant No.71673188).For the problem of joint prevention and control for transboundary water of lakes,based on the existing research results both at home and abroad,combining game theory and stochastic programming optimization theory,Game theory based strategies of joint prevention and control for transboundary water pollution is proposed in this paper.First,the optimal pollutant reduction model is developed by the central government.In that model,based on the amount of raw pollutants generated by the enterprises in each region,not only the economic development of each region and local enterprises but also the impact on environment is considered.Secondly,in view of the allocation of pollutant treatment cost caused by the cooperative management of lakes,i.e.,allocation of alliance game cost.In this paper,three kinds of cost allocation methods,the minimum core method,Shapley value method and the SCRB method are adopted.The fairness of results,and the stability of cooperation alliance analysis according by the different result computed by different allocation method are analyzed.On the basis of that Shapley value method does not take into account the risk of each partner in the cooperative game,the correction algorithm based on risk factors were proposed.Finally,in order to monitor whether every regions’ enterprises discharge pollutant strictly follow the standard of optimized pollutant reduction,a joint prevention and control mechanism for transboundary water pollution in lakes were established to prevent the collusion between region governments and enterprises.Facing the problem of collusion of aiming at discharging pollutant exceed.the appropriate penalty value is designed based on the mechanism design theory.Such model is built to ensure that both the regional government and the local enterprises have no motivation to deviate their strategy to the possible collusions.The validity of the model and the method adopted in this paper were verified through the example of Taihu lake basin.The results show that the larger of the raw pollutant emissions,the greater the reduction should be undertaken.The cost allocation method with higher fairness and stability is conducive to the formation of the cooperative alliance in the lake basin,and the greater of pollutant excess,the greater of penalty value.This study not only solves the problem of optimal reduction and cost allocation of pollutants,but also give some suggestions on corruption prevention between government and enterprises.