| China’s economy has entered a stage of high-quality development in recent years,and one of the core principles is to achieve harmonious development between economic and environment.Our environmental pollution problem has been greatly improved,but the environmental situation is still very serious.There is a great gap of the main indicators such as air pollution and water pollution comparing with developed countries.According to the current trend,the country will continue to suffer from the situation of serious pollution for a long time.The 2018 China Environmental Statistics Yearbook shows that the air quality of217 cities in our country is not up to standard,accounting for more than 65%of domestic cities.These air pollutants are mainly sulfur dioxide,PM2.5,PM10 and ozone,and the concentration of the above pollutants far exceed the level of ordinary cities in developed countries.In water pollution similarly,only 41 lakes have the water quality of class I and II among the 111 important lakes monitored in 2018.Major lakes such as Taihu Lake,Chaohu Lake,and Dianchi Lake were all moderately polluted.Most of the rivers have light and moderate pollution.The above-mentioned pollution not only severely restricts the sustainable development of society,economy and environment,but also threatens people’s health.Therefore,it is especially important for the government to take helpful actions to control pollution emissions.Enterprises are the main source of pollution in the environmental governance system.However,the environment has the attributes of public goods and negative externalities,which leads to market failure,thereby causing excessive emissions from enterprises.Therefore,it is necessary for the government to implement various environmental policies to control the emission reduction behavior of enterprises,resulting in the government’s environmental policy regulation for enterprises.Meanwhile,the above-mentioned pollution problems still have the characteristics of transboundary or cross-border,especially in the field of air pollution.According to relevant research,the impact of regional transmission on air pollution is increasing in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area,Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta.In some areas,the concentration of sulfur dioxide and PM2.5 in the atmosphere from foreign areas contributes 30%-40%.However,the government in each region will choose free-riding and other behaviors for local interests,which leads to the prisoner’s dilemma.which leads to the problem of environmental policy coordination between the regional government and the government.As a result,the issue of environmental policy coordination among the government in each region has arisen.Based on the differential game,this thesis studies the environmental strategy game between government and enterprise,government and government.It mainly analyzes the following problems:The first chapter studies the differential game between local government and enterprises and the choice of government’s environmental policy under the condition of non-transboundary pollution.The feedback Nash equilibrium results are obtained by establishing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman（HJB）equation.Then,comparing the environmental and social benefits brought by policies including emission standards,emission taxes,emission permits trading and a mixture of emission taxes and emission reduction subsidies.The main results of the study show that:The emission standards,emission tax and emission trading policy are completely equivalent when the cost coefficient of emission reduction of enterprises is same.At the same time,the pollution stock of the mixed policy of emission tax and emission reduction subsidy is higher than the above three policies,and the social welfare of the mixed policy is higher than the three policies only when the pollution damage to the environment is less than a certain value.When the cost coefficient of enterprise emission reduction is different,the pollution stock under the emission tax and emission trading policy is the lowest,the emission standard is the second,the mixed policy is the highest.And when the pollution damage to the environment is higher than a certain value,the social welfare under the emission tax and emission trading policy is the highest.Therefore,the optimal choice of the environmental policy by the government is emission tax or emission trading policy from the perspective of environmental and social benefits.Finally,this chapter carries on the numerical dynamic simulation and the parameter sensitivity analysis under the stable state to the above conclusions.The second chapter studies the differential game between local government and enterprises and the choice of government’s environmental policy under the condition of transboundary pollution.Then,comparing the environmental and social benefits brought by policies including emission standards,emission taxes and emission permits trading.The results show that when the emission abatement cost coefficient of enterprises in the two regions is the same,meanwhile,the two regions suffered the same environmental damage.Due to the“rent-shifting”,“policy-leakage”and“free-riding”effects,the total pollution stock is the highest and the social welfare is the lowest of each region under the emission tax policy.The emission standard policy is better than emission tax policy with“rent-shifting”and no“policy-leakage”effect.While,the pollution stock of the two regions is the lowest and the social welfare is the highest under the emission permits trading policy which has no the above three effects.Finally,this chapter considers the asymmetric situation of the cost of emission reduction of the enterprises and the environmental damage coefficient of the two regions.Then,the feedback Nash equilibrium results under the three environmental policies are obtained.And through numerical analysis to study the impact of the changes in the above parameters on the net emissions,total pollution stock and social welfare.The third chapter analyzes the coordination of environmental strategies among different regional governments under the transboundary pollution.We introduce the popular regional environmental policies such as non-cooperative mechanism,ecological compensation mechanism,abatement technology licensing by royalty mechanism and abatement technology licensing by fixed-fee mechanism.The feedback Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained by under the above circumstances through the HJB equation.The main results are as follows:firstly,when the damage of environmental pollution suffered by two regions is relatively high,developed region provide ecological compensation for underdeveloped region is better than that in non-cooperative mechanism in environment and revenue perspective.Secondly,comparing the two kinds of technology licensing,the fixed-fee licensing is more beneficial to both regions in terms of environment and economic benefits.Meanwhile,comparing with ecological compensation mechanism,abatement technology licensing mechanism can better promote the environment.Finally,this chapter analyzes the influences of discount rate,environmental self-decomposition rate and the level of abatement technology on pollution stock and income by numerical method,which shows that“short-sighted”behavior and local environmental decomposition rate will have an important impact on the environmental policy behavior of both regions.The fourth chapter studies the cooperation strategy and dynamic payoff distribution between two regions under the situation of transboundary pollution.The results show that:first of all,the cooperative mechanism is superior to the non-cooperative,ecological compensation and technology licensing policies from the perspective of the environment and total revenues of the regions.Secondly,the dynamic cooperative game and Nash bargaining mechanism are introduced on the basis of ensuring the feasibility of cooperation.Then,the optimal payoff distribution mechanism with time consistency is obtained,and it is proved that it satisfies individual rationality and overall rationality and will not deviate the optimal mechanism with time.Finally,the numerical analysis is carried out for above results.At the same time,the influence of environmental self-decomposition rate and other parameters on the cooperative policy of the two regions is analyzed under the stable state.The numerical analysis of the problem of payoff distribution shows that the distribution income of both regions initially increases with the increase of cooperation time.With the further increase of cooperation time,the distribution income of both parties reaches the highest and gradually converges to the stable state.Finally,Baed on the results of aforementioned theoretical analysis and numerical simulation.This paper summarizes the main conlusions and managerial implications,and put forward the deficiencies of this paper and future research perspectives by referring to the relevant literature and materials. |
