| In order to achieve the goal of carbon peak and carbon neutralization,China continues to deepen the structural reform on the energy supply side and strives to promote the development of the photovoltaic(PV)industry.Because of its zero-emission and renewable advantages,PV is considered to be an important measure to realize the coordinated and sustainable development of energy,economy,and environment.However,China’s PV development is facing some major problems,such as imperfect policy design,unscientific supply chain decision-making.Based on the actual PV supply chain structure,this dissertation selects the government,PV developers,utility firm and residents as the main research object,and divides the relevant PV policies into subsidy policies and punishment policies.Then it is carried out in chronological order.First,from the perspective of PV investment period,the effects of policy subsidies or policy penalties on the optimal strategy choice of residents and utility firm are studied respectively.And then,from the perspective of PV recycling period,the influence of policy subsidies on the optimal decision-making in the process of waste PV recycling is discussed.Based on game theory and complex system theory,this dissertation analyzes the medium-and long-term game behavior of decision-makers by constructing the repeated game model of PV supply chain under policy intervention and discusses the impact of PV policy on the medium and long-term decision-making of supply chain from the perspective of social welfare and investor benefits.The main research conclusions and innovative work of this dissertation are as follows:1.Considering the heterogeneous illumination duration of residents,this dissertation studies the choice of PV supply chain strategy from the perspective of policy subsidies to residents,compares the impact of feed-in tariff(FIT)policy and tax rebate policy subsidies on the income of residents and the profits of PV developer,and gives the optimal implementation strategy of the policy.Under the intervention of FIT,a repeated game model of PV supply chain is constructed to identify the conservative and radical decision-making behavior of decision-makers and their corresponding threshold.Different from the conclusions of the existing literature,this dissertation finds that the medium and long-term average income of decision-makers themselves may increase due to the radical decision-making behavior of others.2.Considering the risk aversion preference of utility firm and the intermittence of PV power generation,this dissertation discusses the impact of subsidy policy on the decision-making of utility firm and PV developers,calculates the threshold of PV material cost parameters,and studies the impact of risk aversion preference on the investment income of utility firm.Based on the actual data,the evolution path of medium and long-term game strategy of decision-makers is given,which proves the rationality of the decline of subsidy policy in reality.Additionally,the model is extended to consider the situation of light abandonment.It is found that light abandonment will inhibit the amount of PV investment,reduce the panel price,and let the level of subsidy to rise.3.Considering the competition between thermal power generation and PV power generation of utility firm,this dissertation constructs a short-term game model including government,PV developer and utility firm,compares the benefits of decision-makers under the situation of implementing and not implementing the quota policy,and gives suggestions on the optimal strategy selection under different situations.This dissertation discusses the medium and long-term PV dynamic pricing and investment strategies of supply chain members,and reveals the impact of different decision-making behaviors on medium and long-term benefits.The result shows that when the resistance to policy implementation is small,the government should increase the proportion of PV power generation quota as soon as possible.At this time,even if the utility firm cannot meet the specified quota requirements,it should also increase the amount of PV investment and installation.4.Considering the joint effect of PV intermittency and PV degradation,this dissertation constructs a short-term game model of waste PV recycling supply chain,compares the impact of the implementation and non-implementation of research and development(R&D)subsidy policy on the decision-making of PV recycling supply chain,and studies the implementation effect of R&D subsidy on the optimal decision-making of recycling supply chain.Based on the bounded rationality assumption,this dissertation studies the impact of decision-makers’ medium and long-term decision-making behavior on average return.The results show that the improvement of PV investors’ risk aversion will reduce the enthusiasm of PV developers for the R&D of recycling technology and reduce the recycling price. |
