| The ownership structure is the soul and foundation of releasing the governance effect of enterprises.Different ownership properties determine that enterprises have different resource endowments,and ultimately affect the financial behavior and operating efficiency of enterprises.At the present stage,the mixed-ownership reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)has become an important breakthrough in the deepening of the reform of SOEs.As early as in 1999,the 14 th Plenary Session of the15 th CPC Central Committee has proposed that state-owned large and medium-sized enterprises implemented the shareholding system and develop the decision of mixedownership reform.In 2013,the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues on Comprehensively Deepening Reform adopted at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee once again focused on developing the reform of the mixed ownership economy and promoting the “crossshareholding” and “mutual integration” ownership structure of state capital,collective capital and non-public capital.The report of the 19 th CPC National Congress in 2017 further proposed to “deepen the reform of SOEs,develop the mixed-ownership economy,and cultivate world-class enterprises with global competitiveness”.From2016 to 2019,it will be carried out four batches of pilot enterprises for the mixedownership reform.In 2018,it will be conducted the “Double Hundred Actions”.So far,the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs has been included in the top-level framework of China’s economic system reform,and has become a key link to stimulate the vitality of SOEs,improve the efficiency of state-owned capital,and optimize the corporate governance structure.At present,the Chinese economy is in a crucial stage of transition from high-speed growth to high-quality development,and the real economy faces major challenges of transformation and upgrading.Entity industries such as manufacturing,which are trapped by profits,are also trapped in the embarrassing situation of low-cost competition.Therefore,entity enterprises turn to the financial industry and the real estate industry one after another,regardless of the interests of minority shareholders and the long-term development goals of enterprises,the pursuit of short-term excess profits,trying to use related transactions to aggressively tax avoidance and excessive financial asset investment,thereby reducing the production efficiency of enterprises.According to data from CSMAR,the annual value of financial assets held by nonfinancial listed companies soared from 12.5 billion yuan in 2003 to 11.7 trillion yuan in 2018.Listed companies show the trend of making profits from the main business to the investment of virtual economy.This phenomenon has been widely concerned by the government,business,and academia.The report of the 19 th National Congress also pointed out that “deepen the reform of the financial system and enhance the ability of the financial sector to serve the real economy” while proposing to deepen the mixed system reform.The phenomenon of“stock price moves together” in China’s stock market is common,which affects the efficiency of resource allocation and information transmission in the stock market.Therefore,mixed-ownership reform and financial services to the real economy together rose to the national development strategy.At this time,the integration of private capital into SOEs has strengthened the intention of SOEs in the mixed-ownership reform to maximize shareholder value as a primary goal.However,what worries the academic community and the public is whether SOEs participating in the mixed-ownership reform will aggressively avoid tax,leaving the national fiscal and tax supply unable to be guaranteed.Compared with non-SOEs,SOEs must shoulder certain political goals and play a key role in social responsibilities such as increasing the rate of employment,fair and reasonable allocating,poverty reduction and the environment protection.Will the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs damage the interests of the beneficiaries?Therefore,this paper takes the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs as the main research object to analyze whether the corporate governance structure of SOEs has been optimized after the mixed reform.Can it alleviate the principal-agent problem? Will it improve the quality of information disclosure? Can the short-sighted opportunistic behavior of state-owned enterprises be restrained? Whether the SOEs after mixedownership reform will aggressively avoid tax? Will it also “shift from real to virtual”?Does it inhibit stock price synchronization? These are the questions that need to be answered urgently in this paper.This paper examines the governance effect of mixed-ownership reform of SOEs from four dimensions of “balance of shareholder ownership power,social responsibility,business performance and market reaction” and two perspectives of internal and external governance effects.The main research conclusions are as follows:First,the shareholder performance of the governance effect of mixed-ownership reform: from the perspective of affiliated transactions of SOEs.This paper finds that the higher the degree of mixed-ownership reform,the lower the related transactions of state-owned enterprises.Based on the study of internal governance mechanism,it is found that the mixed reform of SOEs can effectively exert the balance mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders,improve the quality of internal control,and thus effectively restrain the related transactions of SOEs.At the same time,based on the external governance mechanism,it is found that mixed SOEs receive more media attention,and the external supervision mechanism should strengthen their supervision,to effectively restrain the level of internal related transactions of SOEs.This paper also studies the impact of other external governance environments on the negative correlation between mixed-ownership reform and SOEs’ affiliated transactions.Specifically,for SOEs with low product market competition,low government willingness to delegate power and low external audit quality,there is a more significant negative correlation between the degree of mixed-ownership and affiliated transactions,which indicates that the three have a substitution effect with the mixed reform,and the three have a certain governance effect on the affiliated transactions of enterprises to a certain extent.Second,the tax contribution of the governance effect of mixed-ownership reform:from the perspective of tax avoidance of SOEs.The empirical test results of this paper find that: first,in the process of the mixed reform of SOEs,both the Herfindahl index and the Entropy index of the mixed equity diversification have a significant negative correlation with the tax avoidance level of SOEs,that is,the higher the degree of the mixed reform of SOEs,the lower the tax avoidance level of enterprises.Second,there are internal and external governance mechanisms for the impact of mixed-ownership reform on tax avoidance of SOEs.On the one hand,by stimulating the balance mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders,mixed-ownership reform forces enterprises to improve the quality of information disclosure and alleviate financing constraints,restraints the opportunistic behaviors of controlling shareholders and management of SOEs,and thus restraints corporate tax avoidance.On the other hand,through strengthening the external supervision and governance effect of media exposure and analysts’ attention,mixed-ownership reform restraints the interests of controlling shareholders and management of SOEs on minority shareholders,thus restraints the self-interest behaviors of enterprises due to tax avoidance activities.Both approaches can restrain the level of related transactions of SOEs.Third,based on the cross-section test of external governance environment,it is found that the negative correlation between mixed-ownership reform and corporate tax avoidance is more significant in SOEs in regions with weak tax collection and management strength,high degree of marketization and high willingness of government to delegate power.Fourthly,based on the path of corporate tax avoidance,this paper discusses whether the mixed reform can increase total factor productivity by alleviating tax avoidance behaviors of state-owned enterprises,and the results are verified.Third,the business performance of the governance effect of mixed-ownership reform: from the perspective of SOEs financialization.The results of this paper are as follows: First,in the process of the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs,both the Herfindahl index and the entropy index have a significant negative correlation with the financialization level of SOEs,that is,the higher the degree of the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs,the lower the financialization level of SOEs.Second,there are internal and external governance mechanisms for the impact of mixed-ownership reform on tax avoidance of SOEs.On the one hand,the test of influence mechanism based on internal governance found that the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs can effectively play the role of internal governance,reduce related internal transactions,and thus inhibit the level of financialization of enterprises.On the other hand,the test of influence mechanism based on external governance found that the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs can effectively play the role of corporate external environment governance,increase the attention of analysts,and effectively supervise the self-interest behavior of management,thus inhibiting the level of financialization of enterprises.Third,based on the cross-section test of external governance environment,it is found that in local SOEs,regions with higher degree of marketization and SOEs with higher external audit quality,the negative correlation between mixed-ownership reform and the financialization level of SOEs is more significant.Fourthly,from the perspective of enterprise financialization,this paper discusses how the mixed-ownership reform alleviates the crowding-out effect of SOE financialization on innovation.Fourth,the market reaction to the governance effect of mixed-ownership reform:from the perspective of the synchronization of SOE stock prices.This chapter empirically tests the relationship and influence mechanism between mixed ownership reform and SOE stock price synchronization.The results show that: first,in the process of the mixed reform of SOEs,both the Herfindahl index and the entropy index of the type of mixed reform have a significant negative correlation with the synchronization of the stock price of SOEs,that is,the higher the degree of the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs,the lower the synchronization level of the stock price of enterprises.Based on the robustness tests of propensity score matching,time-varying DID model,instrumental variables and substitution of main variables,the conclusion is still robust.Secondly,the research based on information asymmetry theory finds that the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises can effectively play the role of internal governance of enterprises,reduce the degree of information asymmetry,improve the transparency of accounting information of enterprises,and thus suppress the synchronization level of stock prices.Third,based on the cross-section test of external governance environment,it is found that the degree of marketization,the administrative level of SOEs and media attention all have a moderating effect on the negative correlation between the mixed reform and the synchronization of SOEs’ stock prices.The research innovation of this paper mainly lies in:First,in academic theory,the policy effect of mixed-ownership reform governance of state-owned enterprises should be evaluated.This paper reveals the governance effect and influence mechanism of the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs,and extends the relevant theoretical literature of the mixed-ownership reform.This paper systematically discusses the relationship and influence mechanism between mixedownership reform and SOEs’ related-party transactions,corporate tax avoidance,financialization and stock price synchronicity from two aspects of internal and external governance effects.From the perspective of internal governance effect,mixed reform mainly stimulates the internal governance mechanism through three dimensions:increasing the quality of internal control,improving the quality of information disclosure and alleviating financing constraints.From the perspective of external governance effect,mixed reform can arouse the supervision and evaluation of external public opinion and professionals through the two dimensions of media attention and analyst attention,and then stimulate external governance mechanism,to act on the four economic consequences of SOE related-party transactions,corporate tax avoidance,financialization and stock price synchronization.According to the existing literature,there has been no research on the influence and mechanism of mixed reform on related transactions,tax avoidance,financialization and stock price synchronicity of SOEs.At the same time,there are few literatures to test the policy effect of mixed ownership governance of SOEs by external governance path.This paper effectively supplements relevant literatures on the policy effect of mixed ownership reform of SOEs under micro data,and provides a theoretical basis for scientific and rigorous evaluation of the policy role of mixed ownership.Second,from the academic point of view,this paper provides a more scientific and reasonable evaluation method for the governance effect of mixed-ownership reform of SOEs.Mixed-ownership reform is a dynamic reform behavior,“mixed” is a one-time equity transaction,and “reform” is a dynamic balance of corporate governance,both of which are equity decisions gradually and slowly implemented by enterprises.Therefore,the use of DID or RDD alone cannot accurately and effectively measure the policy effect of mixed-ownership reform of SOEs.At the same time,the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs is a process of self-selection,not completely exogenous,and can be seen as a “quasi-natural experiment”.This paper takes equity diversification after the mixed-ownership reform as the starting point and measures the governance effect of the mixed-ownership reform with the method of time-varying DID.From related-party transactions,financing constraints,analyst earnings forecast,etc.,study of mixed change tax of the enterprise,the influence of the financialization level and stock price synchronicity,from the level of related-party transactions,corporate tax avoidance,financialization and stock price synchronicity three different perspectives,test their mixed-ownership reform of SOEs to change the total factor productivity,the enterprise value and the regulation of the positive correlation relationship between management risk effect.Third,in terms of research samples,a full-sample proprietary database of stateowned enterprises is constructed.A full-sample proprietary database of the top ten shareholding structures and shareholder nature of A-share state-owned listed enterprises from 2003 to 2018 was collected manually.Meanwhile,A database of nonstate-owned shareholder governance,A database of several major shareholders and A manual database of concerted actors were established to provide data support for this paper.At the same time,further subdivided the top 10 shareholders nature species,to subdivide equity property types including state-owned equity,natural person and family businesses,private equity,financial structure,foreign equity stake and other six categories,and provides the scientific and effective measure to mix to a set of comprehensive,system and novel method,for the further design of mix proportion of equity structure to provide empirical evidence in SOEs,It provides a solid data basis for the future research on shareholder network relationship. |
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