| With socialism with Chinese characteristics entering a "new era",the reform of China’s state-owned enterprises has entered a new stage of mixed ownership reform.Strengthening,optimizing and expanding state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises release huge reform space for promoting the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises in the new era.As the main way to strengthen,optimize and enlarge the state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises,the most direct manifestation of the mixed ownership reform is to introduce non-state-owned shareholders to realize the adjustment of ownership structure on the premise of maintaining the controlling position of the original state-owned shareholders.through "power sharing" to give non-state-owned shareholders the ability and influence of "voice",give full play to the positive role of the market-oriented power of non-state-owned shareholders.And then through the marketization of governance structure to promote the marketization of state-owned enterprise management,to achieve non-state-owned shareholder governance to promote the healthy development of enterprises at all levels to strengthen,optimize and expand state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises.At the same time,the rapid development of China’s economy has formed a development guide with high-quality development as the theme and supply-side structural reform as the main line.Specifically,for a long time,China’s rapid economic growth has been achieved mainly through high input and high accumulation,and capital investment has always been the core driving force of China’s rapid economic growth;secondly,as China’s economy enters a "new normal" from high-speed growth to high-quality growth,promoting the development demand with supply-side structural reform as the main line,it is proposed to balance the leverage ratio to reduce the financial risk of the economy as a whole.Moreover,behind the impressive growth rate of economic development,hidden worries about the quality of economic development are gradually exposed,and it is necessary to improve the efficiency of the use of production factors and the total factor productivity of the economy as a whole.As the economic basis of socialism with Chinese characteristics,state-owned enterprises play an important role in promoting rapid economic growth,preventing and controlling financial risks and promoting high-quality economic development by increasing their capital investment,controlling their leverage range and improving their total factor productivity.However,since the financial crisis in 2008,state-owned enterprises have shown the characteristics of reduced investment scale,reduced investment proportion and investment growth rate,accelerated increase in leverage ratio,high overall level,low total factor productivity and declining growth rate.The decline of capital investment is not conducive to the maintenance and appreciation of state-owned assets,the rise of leverage ratio also increases the financial risk of enterprises,and the low total factor productivity can also reduce the innovation ability of enterprises.Obviously,the emergence of these problems not only suppresses the strength and expansion of state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises,but also suppresses economic growth,magnifies financial risks and hinders high-quality development.Therefore,under the background of deepening the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,as the key factor of mixed ownership reform,the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders on state-owned enterprises in the aspects of capital investment,leverage ratio and total factor productivity has become the focus of attention and discussion from all walks of life.Based on this,this paper first demonstrates the relationship between non-state-owned shareholders’ shareholding and capital investment,leverage ratio and total factor productivity in state-owned enterprises through the integrated framework of hybrid oligopoly model and Euler investment equation model,Melitz-Manova model and theoretical deduction method.Then,taking the state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2018 as a sample,we manually sort out the nature,relationship and shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders disclosed in the company’s annual report,and construct unbalanced panel data including the shareholding ratio of non-state-owned shareholders and the shareholding ratio of state-owned shareholders.The two-way fixed effect model is used to empirically test the relationship between non-state-owned shareholder governance and capital investment,leverage ratio and total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises.The specific conclusions are as follows:(1)The governance of non-state-owned shareholders can significantly promote the effective increase of capital investment in state-owned enterprises.This paper analyzes the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the capital investment of state-owned enterprises from both theoretical and empirical aspects.Theoretical analysis shows that the higher the proportion of non-state-owned shareholders,the more capital investment of state-owned enterprises.The empirical study shows that there is a significant positive correlation between non-state-owned shareholder governance and capital investment of state-owned enterprises,indicating that the improvement of the governance level of non-state-owned shareholders significantly increases the capital investment of state-owned enterprises.And the mechanism of this significant relationship shows a significant positive correlation between non-state-owned shareholder governance and state-owned enterprise financing constraints,and a significant positive correlation between non-state-owned shareholder governance and enterprise financing constraints and enterprise capital investment.it shows that non-state-owned shareholder governance can promote the increase of enterprise capital investment by effectively alleviating the financing constraints faced by state-owned enterprises.At the same time,in the economic consequence analysis of the benchmark test,it is found that the multiplication of non-state-owned shareholder governance and state-owned enterprise capital investment is significantly positively related to underinvestment,but not to over-investment.it shows that the increase of capital investment in state-owned enterprises driven by non-state-owned shareholder governance significantly improves the underinvestment of enterprises,but does not cause obvious over-investment.In other words,the improvement of the governance level of non-state-owned shareholders has effectively promoted the increase of capital investment in state-owned enterprises.Further analysis shows that there is a significant positive correlation between non-state-owned shareholder governance and capital investment of state-owned enterprises only in competitive industries,but not in monopoly industries,indicating that compared with monopoly state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned shareholder governance is more conducive to the increase of capital investment in competitive state-owned enterprises.(2)The governance of non-state-owned shareholders can significantly reduce the high leverage of state-owned enterprises.This paper also analyzes the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises from both theoretical and empirical aspects.Theoretical analysis shows that the more non-state-owned shareholders hold shares,the faster the leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises decreases.The empirical study shows that the governance of non-state-owned shareholders is significantly negatively correlated with the leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises,indicating that the improvement of the governance level of non-state-owned shareholders significantly reduces the high leverage of state-owned enterprises.And the internal mechanism of this significant relationship shows that the governance of non-state-owned shareholders has a significant negative correlation with the short-term leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises,but there is no significant correlation with the long-term leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises.it shows that the effect of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the high leverage of state-owned enterprises is mainly reflected in that non-state-owned shareholders reduce the short-term high leverage of state-owned enterprises by playing a governance role,while the effect on long-term high leverage of enterprises is still limited.(3)The governance of non-state-owned shareholders can significantly improve the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises.This paper still analyzes the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises from both theoretical and empirical aspects.Theoretical analysis shows that the more non-state-owned shareholders hold shares,the faster the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises increases.The empirical study shows that there is a significant positive correlation between non-state-owned shareholder governance and the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises,indicating that the improvement of the governance level of non-state-owned shareholders has significantly improved the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises.Further analysis shows that at the level of industry competition,non-state-owned shareholder governance and total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises show a significant positive correlation only in competitive industries,but there is no significant correlation in monopoly industries,indicating that compared with monopoly state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned shareholder governance is more conducive to the increase of total factor productivity of competitive state-owned enterprises.In the process of marketization,the governance of non-state-owned shareholders and the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises show a significant positive correlation only in the areas with higher degree of marketization,but there is no significant correlation in the areas with lower degree of marketization,indicating that compared with the state-owned enterprises in areas with lower degree of marketization,the improvement of the level of governance of non-state-owned shareholders is more conducive to the improvement of total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises in areas with higher degree of marketization.In terms of government administrative level,non-state-owned shareholder governance and total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises only show a significant positive correlation in local state-owned enterprises,but there is no significant correlation in central state-owned enterprises,indicating that compared with central state-owned enterprises,the improvement of the governance level of non-state-owned shareholders is more conducive to the improvement of total factor productivity of local state-owned enterprises.In addition,the governance of non-state-owned shareholders is also faced with some practical challenges:the governance of non-state-owned shareholders is mainly faced with relevant interest groups such as state-owned departments,managers of state-owned enterprises and employees of state-owned enterprises.resistance to the construction of backward systems and public worries,such as the incentive mechanism for the operation of state-owned assets,the fault-tolerant mechanism for leaders of state-owned enterprises and the mutual trust mechanism between shareholders and so on.The research of this paper has important policy implications for the reform of state-owned enterprises under the background of "new era" and "new normal".We will continue to vigorously promote the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises,implement the effective combination of mixed ownership reform with the investment and financing system of state-owned enterprises,financial and financial risk prevention and control system and innovation-driven development system,and further relax the control of monopoly areas that are not entirely related to national security and the national economy and people’s livelihood.We will further improve the macro-governance environment and vigorously explore more effective mixed ownership reform measures at the level of central state-owned enterprises.In order to further promote the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned capital can be introduced through public listing,the introduction of strategic investors,the establishment of capital investment and operation companies,the establishment of state-owned enterprise reform funds and employee shareholding.We will further establish and improve the supervision system of state-owned capital,the market-oriented selection and employment mechanism of state-owned enterprise managers,the incentive mechanism and the property rights protection system to ensure the effective implementation of non-state-owned shareholder governance.Compared with the existing literature,the research of this paper has the following five aspects of innovation and value:first,this paper enriches the research on the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders when promoting the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises by analyzing the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on corporate capital investment,leverage ratio and total factor productivity.Second,by examining the relationship between non-state-owned shareholder governance and capital investment of state-owned enterprises,this paper expands the existing research on the influencing factors of capital investment of state-owned enterprises.Third,this paper deepens the literature research on the main factors of reducing the high leverage of state-owned enterprises by examining the relationship between the governance of non-state-owned shareholders and the leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises.Fourth,this paper examines the relationship between non-state-owned shareholder governance and enterprise total factor productivity,which is the main content of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,which is conducive to a deeper understanding of the influencing factors of total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises.Fifth,this paper further expands the research on the influencing factors of the financing constraints of state-owned enterprises by analyzing the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the financing constraints of state-owned enterprises.However,this paper also has many shortcomings and inadequacies,the possible future studies are:first,combined with the database of Chinese industrial enterprises to conduct a larger sample of research.In this paper,when analyzing the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders under the background of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,only the data of state-owned listed companies are used to analyze the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on corporate capital investment,leverage ratio and total factor productivity,but not the state-owned enterprise data of Chinese industrial enterprise database.The second is to further explore the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders from the perspective of the allocation of control rights of non-state-owned shareholders.In this paper,when measuring the governance level of non-state-owned shareholders in the process of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,it is mainly measured from the ownership structure of non-state-owned shareholders,but not defined from the perspective of control.However,due to the imperfect market structure,there is still the possibility of non-equal allocation of equity and control rights in some state-owned enterprises.The third is to divide the financing constraints faced by state-owned enterprises into internal constraints and external constraints for more in-depth exploration.In this paper,when analyzing the mechanism of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the capital investment of state-owned enterprises,it is found that non-state-owned shareholder governance can alleviate the financing constraints of enterprises,and the financing constraints faced by enterprises are an important factor in enterprise investment and financing.related to the sustainable development and growth of enterprises.The fourth is to examine the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on corporate leverage from the point of view of the separation of state-owned enterprises from the functions of social offices.This paper lacks the analysis of enterprise heterogeneity when studying the relationship between the governance of non-state-owned shareholders and the leverage ratio of state-owned enterprises,because the social office function of state-owned enterprises may increase their leverage ratio,after removing the social office function of different types of state-owned enterprises,their behavior may be different. |
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