Research On Inter-Administrative Basin Pollution Cooperative Governance Mechanism From The Perspective Of Inter-Government Game Theory

With the increasingly prominent watershed pollution problems in China and the contradiction between water use in the upstream and downstream of the river basin,inter-administrative watershed pollution has severely restricted the sustainable development of China’s regional economy.Cooperative watershed pollution control has become an important topic in current public management research.The indivisibility of the administrative model of the basin administrative area and the externality of the inter-administrative basin have formed a natural contradiction.At present,both the academic research level and the actual governance level have reached a basic consensus on the issue of inter-administrative basin watershed governance,that is,breaking the territorial management model and move into the basin cooperative governance of local governments.In the study of inter-administrative river basin cooperative governance,this paper,through a review of domestic and foreign literature,finds that there are a series of contradictions and dilemmas in the upstream and downstream governments of the river basin at different stages of agreement,implementation,etc.There are different individual rational choices in reality,which lead to cooperation failure.Investigating the root causes,local governments have a game of interests in the process of inter-administrative governance,that is,governance costs and benefits are difficult to achieve equilibrium between game players,and the key to solving the dilemma of cooperation is to build a cost-benefit equilibrium mechanism.What are the contradictions of inter-administrative basin cooperation governance?how do these contradictions cause difficulties in the cooperation process of local government cooperation?Are there any deep-seated incentives behind these dilemmas?How to stimulate the effectiveness of local governments within the river basin by constructing cooperative governance mechanisms?These issues are the main goals to be elaborated in this article.Based on the perspective of inter-government game theory,this paper discusses the above issues and combines the experience of large river basin governance abroad,in order to build a cooperative governance mechanism for river basins to resolve the dilemma of gaming.Inter-administrative river basin cooperative governance is a long-term dynamic process,including the indispensable links such as the formulation,implementation and dynamic supervision of cooperative governance agreements.In the realistic situation,contradictions are mainly concentrated in the growing financial investment in water pollution control of river basins and the situation of asymmetry of input-output between the river basin governance and the results with little effect.As the spokesperson of local interests,various local governments within the river basin are the contradictory complex of local economic interests and local public interests.The cooperation of local governments across river basin governance across administrative regions is an inevitable result of a series of intertwined interests.The needs of local go’vernments in the upstream and downstream of the river basin for the public interest of the river basin environment are the starting point for cooperation.The equilibrium mechanism between governance cost and benefits is an important guarantee for the effectiveness and continuity of cooperation.In the realistic situation,the cost and benefits in river basin governance reach an effective equilibrium.In the process of river basin governance across administrative regions,the strategic choices made by local governments based on their own cost and benefit considerations under the premise of asymmetric information will inevitably lead to cooperation difficulties.The emergence of the cooperation dilemma is manifested in all aspects of the agreement,implementation,and supervision.From the perspective of inter-go vernment game theory,the upstream and downstream local governments in the river basin are regarded as game players,and each game player has two strategies of"governance" and "non-governance".The two strategies,under the premise of information asymmetry,for the sake of self-interest considerations,"non-governance" must be the dominant choice in the strategy.Although the inter-governmental game in the realistic background is extremely complicated,it is clear that this is why to reach an equilibrium mechanism.The analysis of the internal mechanism of the cooperation dilemma belongs to the category of theoretical analysis.Using panel data from the Yangtze River Basin and even the national river basin to analyze the mutual game between local governments across river basin governance is an empirical analysis.The analysis results show that local governments have significant influence.Attribution analysis of the dual conclusions of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis,to explore the underlying incentives behind the cooperation dilemma,the administrative mode of territorial territories is the institutional background of the cooperation dilemma,and the equilibrium of the interests of local governments across river basins is the internal root of the cooperation dilemma.In the long rivers of inter-administrative river basin cooperative governance research,foreign large river basin cooperative governance experience is equally important.Based on the governance experience of the Rhine River Basin in Europe and the Tennessee River Basin in the United States,this paper summarizes its common practices when facing river basin pollution,such as establishing a cooperative governance concept,building an efficient river basin pollution operation mechanism,and adhering to environmental protection and comprehensive development combination and so on,and then combined with the actual situation of domestic river basins,provide a reference for resolving the dilemma of inter-governmental games.In order to resolve the cooperation dilemma from the perspective of inter-governmental game theory,how to achieve effective cooperation across river basin governance through the construction of cooperative governance mechanisms in local governments is the key of discussion.From the perspective of inter-governmental games,combining foreign river basin governance experience,the cooperative governance mechanism should include three levels.Firstly,the level of consciousness,starting from game thinking and strengthening public interest cognition and cooperative governance concepts;the second,from the perspective of inter-governmental games,building a cost-benefit equilibrium mechanism in the governance process,which is the key to solving the dilemma of the game;the last,the construction of supporting mechanisms,mainly including the construction of negotiation mechanisms,enforcement mechanisms,and supervision mechanisms.