Pacific paradox: Canadian foreign policy in Korea, Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China, 1947--1970

Since the early 1990s, much has been written concerning the evolving nature of security in the Asia Pacific region. How does one best explain the dramatic transformation in this part of the world from an era of strict bilateralism to a period of significantly increasing multilateralism? This core question has been largely overlooked.; In what might be described as Canada's 'Pacific paradox,' despite active involvement in the region since at least the end of the Second World War, scant attention has been paid to Canada's role in facilitating increased security in the Pacific. The central focus of this study will entail an examination of Canadian attempts at promoting security in East Asia from 1947 until 1970 within the context of receding American hegemony and Cold War politics. The cases selected for this study include: (1) Canada's involvement in Korean peninsula affairs (1947--54); (2) Canada's supervisory role in the initial stages of the Vietnamese conflict (1954--68); (3) Canada's efforts to seat the Mainland Chinese in the United Nations (1966--68); and (4) Canada's decision to, and subsequent recognition of, the People's Republic of China (1968--70).; As a working premise, it will be argued that America's relative hegemonic decline---particularly in the immediate post-war period up until the early 1970s---has enabled Canada to play a unique international role fostering increased security in East Asia. That is to say, as the distributional structure of the international system underwent a shift from bipolarity towards increased multipolarity, the pattern of action and reaction between states invariably experienced change. Of particular concern here is the impact of hegemonic decline on middle-sized countries of relatively high international involvement. Although individually incapable of assuming a hegemonic role, such states are capable of performing leadership duties aimed at sustaining the order in place. In so doing, 'system supporters' are afforded the opportunity to lobby for collective action towards their own nationally defined self-interested goals, which while potentially being of benefit to the system as a whole, may be at odds with the wishes of the hegemon.; In brief, the evidence indicates that despite possessing and exercising a degree of foreign policy latitude in East Asia not generally recognized by academics, Canada's policy choices were severely circumscribed by the international system in the immediate post-World War Two period of integral hegemony. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)...