| The second half of the 20th Century marked an enormous change in the agricultural and economic environment of the Andean farmer. The Green Revolution came to Peru in 1971 with the opening of the International Potato Center (CIP) in Lima. CIP's mission was to help reduce poverty using genetically-improved potato varieties. In less than a decade, CIP had deployed a host of improved potato varieties, designed to have pest resistance, shorter growing cycles, and higher responsiveness to chemical fertilizers. At the same time, urban growth and infrastructure development helped connect remote regions with commercial centers. Taken together, these changes induced a transition from traditional potato cultivation to modern farming.;How have the farmers of the Peruvian Andes adapted to this transition? Specifically, how have they obtained improved potato varieties and the agricultural chemicals necessary to grow them? Do they have sufficient knowledge to use these new varieties to their full potential? Have they abandoned the use of native varieties altogether? Have poorer farmers been left out of this process?;We spent six months in Cajamarca, Peru, gathering data on this subject. Using a household survey, we collected extensive data on 500 households. This dissertation presents an empirical analysis of this data.;The first chapter focuses on farmers' knowledge of genetically-improved potato varieties and pest control. We discuss the key risks in potato cultivation, and the strategies farmers use to manage them.;In the second chapter we find that although poor farmers have access to credit, they are unwilling to obtain loans to purchase agricultural inputs because of the risks of crop failure. Instead, they use sharecropping contracts to acquire seeds and chemicals. The contracts provide insured-credit; in the event of a crop failure, the farmers pay nothing for the inputs they received from the landlord. Unfortunately, this insurance is very expensive.;Although farmers pay more for seed through sharecropping, we observe that the poorest farmers receive the best terms in their sharecropping contracts. The third chapter analyzes the relationship between the wealth levels of contracting parties and the input-packages they receive through sharecropping. We find that poorer households receive better terms in their sharecropping contracts than wealthier households. After presenting these results, we offer possible explanations for this paradox. (Abstract shortened by UMI.). |
