| Over two essays I conduct empirical industrial organization studies using time series econometric techniques with applications to natural resource markets. In my first essay I propose a new econometric method, which employs non-linear filtering methods, to estimate time-varying bargaining power in bilateral bargaining markets with exogenously determined quantities. The technique is applied to an ex-vessel fish market where, over the time span examined, the fishers were given individually assigned harvest quotas. The results show that the fishers do increase their bargaining power after the rights-based management system is implemented, but they do not reach the point of complete rent extraction as proposed in other works. The second essay examines the effect that rights-based management has on processors' supply in fisheries where multiple products are derived from a single species. This analysis uses data from the Alaska pollock fishery to determine, via a cointegration with structual breaks estimation technique, that the processors' output does become more price-responsive after rights-based management is implemented. |
