Research On Cross-organizational Cooperative Innovation Behavior Of Project Based On Quasi-Market Organization

It has become the main melody of large-scale and complex projects that the owners entrust many enterprises which have different knowledge,technology and other items to undertake the project work.The benefit of the project,even the success or failure of the project is closely related to the behavior of the enterprises,especially the innovation behavior.Uncertain project output,possible technology spillover,and during the transition period,the organizational structure of large-scale and complex projects in our country has quasi-market characteristics,all of which will greatly affect the behavior choice of engineering contractors.So,based on the consideration of the influence of cooperative content and cooperative environment on the behavior choice of project participants,this paper analyzes the quasimarket organizations with different links,and studies the cooperative innovation behavior of the engineering contractors under the quasi-market organization.Firstly,this paper analyzes the reality of the quasi-market organization characteristics of large-scale and complex projects in our country,and the management problems that may be faced,then puts forward the necessity,theoretical value and practical significance of the research,determines the goal,content,method and technical route of the research,and introduces the relevant theories.Secondly,this paper analyzes the quasi-market organization structure of large-scale and complex projects in the period of economic transformation,explores the conditions of the project contractors' cooperative innovation behavior under the different bond-linked quasimarket organizations,and the incentive points of the owners,and puts forward the relevant theoretical propositions and constructs the theoretical framework of the follow-up research.Thirdly,this paper investigates cooperative innovation mechanism between the owner and the engineering contractors with kinship,by using evolutionary game analysis method.It analyzes the replication dynamic model of engineering contractor's cooperative innovation,based on the consideration of kinship,trust relationship,innovation risk and technology spillover.And it verifies the theoretical analysis results by numerical simulation.The results show that the strong kin altruistic preference or the good trust relationship has a positive effect on the cooperative innovation behavior of the engineering contractors and the incentive effect on the excess income distribution.The high technology spillover and innovation risk hinder the cooperative innovation behavior of the engineering contractors and the incentive effect on the excess income distribution.Further,this paper builds multi-agent simulation model using netlogo software to study the evolution of the kinship engineering contractors' behavior and the evolution of the owner's revenue under different excess income distribution or different subsidy.It found that excess income distribution is helpful to promote the cooperation of engineering contractors and improve the owner's revenue;in consideration of kinship,some subsidy can improve the incentive effect of excess income distribution mechanism to some degree,but when distribution coefficient is irrational,the incentive of subsidy may fail;when the spillover effect is large,the contribution of owner subsidy to the construction contractor's innovation investment is greater,and the reasonable subsidy coefficient can be relatively reduced with the spillover coefficient increasing.Fourthly,in view of the economic transition period,the quasi-market organization formed by the owner,the internal and external engineering contractors,this paper analyzes the dynamic evolvement process of the cooperation strategy selection of various engineering contractors,and the influence of the factors such as the innovation risk and the technology spillover,especially the kin altruistic preference and the non-system punishment on the behavior choice of various engineering contractors.The results show that for the engineering contractors by the original enterprise restructuring,enhancing kin altruistic utility and trust based on the kinship;for new entrants,moderately increasing openness of market and improving it,enhancing non-system punishment,that can respectively reduce the engineering contractors' reliance on excess income distribution,and strengthen their cooperative innovation with the owner.Further,considering the horizontal competition between the engineering contractors,this paper establishes principal-agent model to analyze the problem that the owner sets up the tournament and the credit evaluation competition mechanism to motivate the cooperative innovation behavior of the engineering contractors.It analyzes how the competition mechanisms effect on the engineering contractors' behavioral decision and owner's revenue,when internal and external engineering contractors have the same ability or not.It found that,under the different ability condition,the greater the kin altruism preference and reward or punishment degree of credit evaluation,the greater the innovation effort of the engineering contractors.And only when the credit evaluation mechanism satisfies certain conditions,the tournament mechanism can motivate the cooperative innovation behavior of the engineering contractors.Under the same ability condition,the smaller the random disturbance and the technology spillovers,the greater the reward or punishment degree of credit evaluation and the incentive or constraint bonus of tournament,the greater the innovation effort of the engineering contractors.Compared with external engineering contractors,kin internal engineering contractors put into higher innovation effort.In addition,some theoretical analysis results are validated by case studies to reflect the practical guiding significance of the research on the project management practice.Finally,the research conclusion is summarized and the research direction is pointed out.