Research On The Design Of Government Environmental Protection Strategy And The Influence On Enterprise Behavior

In recent years,hostile environment has aroused the concern of the people of all circles.Throughout a product’s life cycle,the product has caused varying degrees of pollution by producing,using,recycling.This paper takes a product life cycle as the main line to study the behavior of companies and consumers as well as decision making of the government.The main work and innovation of this paper are as follow:(1)Two companies have different level of emissions,but produce substitutable products.With this condition,we investigate the effect on companies,consumers and environment caused by different allocated scheme involved grandfathering and benchmarking.The main results are: From the aspect of individual company’s profit and quantity,we find grandfathering is more suitable for the company whose emission is more,whereas,the company who lets out less emissions prefers benchmarking to grandfathering.However,if considering the whole industry’s quantity,consumer surplus,profits and social welfare,we find that a carbon emission allocation scheme is no forever better than another one,and the condition that which allocation scheme is better is effected by emission reduction target,the market size.Furthermore,when the emission reduction policy is loose,the profits of the whole industry may decrease.Finally,by comparing the two scenarios that allowing companies to trade with each other or not,we find the company’s profit,quantity and the consumer surplus are improved by trading,but trading has no effect on environment.(2)We study how the government to design energy-saving contract and the product design with energy conservation and emission reduction policy.We consider two environmental performance objectives: maximizing the unit energy saving index and maximizing the total energy saving index.The results show: when the subsidy budget is low,the optimal energy-saving contract under two objectives are the same,then the company and the consumers cannot make a profit form the energy saving policy;when the subsidy budget is high,the company and the consumers both can earn profits from the energy saving policy only with the maximizing the total energy saving object.(3)We investigate the competitive advantage of qualified recycler competing with unqualified recycler based on current situation that the shortages of waste products for the qualified recycler in the recycling market at present.This research is very rare in the past study.We take the disposal fee imposed from the manufacturing to make up disposal fund for subsidizing qualified recycler according to Regulation on the Administration of the Recovery and Disposal of Waste Electrical and Electronic Products.By analysing,we find that when taking maximizing the social welfare as the object,the disposal fund may be not use out under some condition.By comparing the two scenario which implementing EPR or not,we find that implementing EPR improves environment,but injures companies’ profits.Under some condition,implementing EPR maybe decrease the consumer surplus and the social welfare.(4)We study the EPR effect on manufacturing and dismantling industry by formulating a two-period model which contains producing and recycling period.By analyzing,we find that when the disposal fee increases,the recycling price of qualified recycler first increases and then decreases,the recycling price of unqualified recycler first decreases and then increases.however,the recycling quantity and the profits of two recyclers decrease.In addition,we also find that the subsidy is not the more the better for company and consumers.We get a result which is different from the fourth chapter about the disposal fund balance: the disposal fund should be used out with the optimal subsidy and disposal fee.