Inter-supply Chain Competitive Decision Considering Green Manufacturer’s Risk Attitude Under Government Subsidy

Green supply chain management aims to incorporate environmental performance into raw materials,manufacturing,transportation and other production and sales links to achieve a balance between economic and environmental benefits.Its adaptation to the concept of modern sustainable development has led more and more companies to try to go green transformation.However,factors such as green technical barriers and fluctuations in the new product market require companies to assess transformation risks and actual utility.The government needs to consider policy issues such as whether to subsidize,how to subsidize,and how much to subsidize.Choose between green products with advantages.The different demands of stakeholders create a complex game situation in the implementation of green supply chain management.Therefore,how to promote the development of green supply chain in the complex market of government intervention,heterogeneous demands of consumers and enterprise competition has become a practical problem faced by enterprises and governments.Based on the above background,under the three situations of no government subsidy,government discount subsidy and government fixed subsidy,this paper considers that green manufacturers have three risk attitude choices: risk neutrality,risk aversion and risk preference,and introduces consumers’ green preference,to construct the competitive game model of green supply chain and ordinary supply chain under different circumstances.Through the Stackelberg game and the Cournot equilibrium,the equilibrium solutions under different models are obtained,and the influence of the consumer’s green preference coefficient,green manufacturer’s risk coefficient and government subsidy coefficient on product greenness,supply chain members’ profits and The impact of the total profit of the supply chain,and finally compare different game models from the three perspectives of economic benefit,environmental benefit and comprehensive benefit,and obtain the optimal government subsidy strategy under each situation.The main conclusions drawn in this paper are as follows:(1)Regardless of the risk attitude adopted by the green manufacturer and whether the government subsidizes it or not,the increase in consumers’ green preference will increase the greenness and profit of green products,leading to a decline in the price and profit of ordinary products.(2)For the supply chain structure of decentralized operation,when there is no government subsidy or the amount of government subsidy is low,it is better for green manufacturers to adopt a lower degree of risk preference strategy;when the amount of government subsidy is high enough,it should adopt a more Aggressive risk appetite strategy.(3)Under the risk aversion attitude of green manufacturers,when consumers’ green preference is too low,green manufacturers’ risk aversion degree is too high,and government subsidy intensity is insufficient,the profit of green manufacturers will be lower than that of ordinary manufacturers.At this time,if the total profit of the green supply chain is lower than that of the ordinary supply chain,it will be unprofitable for the manufacturer to turn to green production;Downstream retailers all benefit from the production and sales of green products.(4)Under the risk preference attitude adopted by green manufacturers,when the green preference of consumers is too low,the risk preference of green manufacturers is too high and the intensity of government subsidies is insufficient,the profit of green supply chain retailers will be lower than that of ordinary supply chain retailers.Similar to risk avoidance,when the total profit of green supply chain is lower than the ordinary supply chain,retailers will give up selling green products and the supply chain will be broken;when the total profit of green supply chain is higher than the ordinary supply chain,the excess profit needs to be redistributed.(5)In the face of risk-neutral and risk-averse green manufacturers,the government aiming at maximizing economic benefits should adopt a non-subsidy strategy,and the government aiming at maximizing environmental benefits and comprehensive benefits should adopt fixed-rate subsidies Strategy.Facing green manufacturers with risk preference,it is better for the government aiming at maximizing economic benefits and comprehensive benefits to implement discount subsidies,while the government aiming at maximizing environmental benefits should implement fixed subsidies.