The Evolutionary Game Study On Coal Mine Safety Supervision

Coal mine safety is a hot topic in China's economic construction, caused widespread concern from the government and the people. However, there is lack of study on dynamic evolutionary behave process of both Coal mine corporation side and Supervision side, At present, coal mine safety supervision research is still mainly focused on describing static characteristics of coal mine and supervision organization. After studying on dynamic evolutionary behave process of Coal mine corporation side and supervision organization side, we can explore the evolutionary path and stabile state of the coal cine corporation and cupervision organization, whicn can provide an important method to supervision soal mine safety effectively and also can achieve effective protection to relevant interests-holders. Therefore, the study has important theoretical and practical significance.In reality, both coal mine safety supervision sides are limited rational, the study had introduced "survival of the fittest" thinking of biological evolution, regarded soal mine safety supervision as a soal mine safety supervision behavior dynamic evolutionary ecosystem. First, applied Monomorphic Population dynamic model in evolutionary game theory to build coal enterprises beehive's evolutionary game model, and analyzed the steady-state characteristics and its affecting factors of evolutionary system; Second, based on the structure of China's soal mine safety supervision, analyzed evolutionary behave stability of coal mine safety inspectors; Third , from social reality angle, the steady state of evolutionary behave which under two special bribery probability of coal mine safety inspectors was analyzed; Forth, through Polymorphic Populations Dynamic model of both coal mine cafety cupervision sides, behave tropism of game two parties under different circumstances which exist bribery or not were analyzed. Finally, the study concluded above cited case with demonstration analysis.Innovative ideas in this study is combined evolutionary game theory with actual situation of coal mine cafety cupervision, systematically explained the behavior tropism of both sides in coal mine safety supervision.