The Study, Based On The Incentive Compatibility Of Coal Mine Safety Rules

In recent years, frequent coal-mine accidents, which still not ceased under the repeated harsh rectifying, have become the bottleneck of China's construction of harmonious society and the realization of sustaining social and economic progress, received wide attention from the public sector and related academia. According to current research on this case, domestic scholars have researched the reason from different aspects, while largely in local links of the regulation chain but lack of a complete analysis. This paper attempts to establish a complete chain of analysis to explain the reasons for the accidents, in order to enhance people's understanding of the reality and moreover to provide a selectable idea to avoid further incidents occurred.There is a supervising chain which referred three levels hidden the China coal-mine accidents, including four benefit entities, which are the central government, local governments, coal-mine enterprises and coal-miners, and the three levels are central government - local government, local government -coal-mine enterprises, coal-mine enterprises - mines. For every entity has different benefit demand, so this paper researched the reason through Game Theory. At the same time, it's impossible to explain the cause of China's coal-mine accidents accurately in any local chain Game analysis system, as all the entities' Game will affect the eventual effect of coal-mine safety policy. For seeking an appropriate treatment to the coal mine, China must control the whole regulation chain. So this paper investigates from the aspect of the Game theory, based on the benefit among the central government, local governments, coal-mine enterprises and coal-miners from the aspect of Game theory and establishes three groups of game models. At the meantime, for the Game between entities must affects the final effect of the coal-mine safety policy, any partial Game analysis couldn't systemically and exactly explain the essential reason why China coal-mine accidents occurred repeatedly, it's necessary to seek a suitable management from the supervisory chain of China coal-mine.Based on the analysis of accident causes, this paper does a further analysis through the establishment of three-group incentive compatibility models according to the theory of incentive compatibility, corresponding to the Game of the three groups. In theory, the key to handle the effectiveness of information and incentive compatibility issues properly is constructing scientific and effective system mechanisms, China's coal mine accidents occurred because of the design of fundamental reform institution has not handled the incentive compatibility issues. So the key to build coal-mine safety regulation system that suitable to the national conditions is reconstructing total capacity interests, including the political incentive mechanism for the governments, encourage coal enterprises to improve the safety facilities and encourage coal-miners to be trained serious system. With the establishment of Incentive compatible system, central government, local governments, mine enterprises and coal-miners will pursuit their own benefit in the framework of the new system, and also promote the realization of social objectives. Generally speaking, on a the basis of finding out the root causes of the coal mines accident, incentive mechanism is introduced to all levels, making use of incentive compatibility between the various benefits of the entities tending to be on the line.This article's analysis indicated that negative incentive is more favorable and more lasting way for the effect of China's current coal Regulation. Therefore, in the first two levels, it should strengthen the coal mine safety supervision of central government to local governments, and the penalties of local governments to coal enterprises, this is the necessary conditions for signing an effective contracts between central government and local governments, local governments and the coal enterprises, which means principal implement the threat of severe punishment is credible. However, for making the effect of regulation significantly, it also being supported by some positive incentive forms to resolve the issue of benefit sharing between central government and local governments, local governments and coal mine enterprises, from being negative incentives and positive incentives to promote local governments and coal enterprises to truly implement the mine safety policy that the central government and local governments ordered. Meanwhile, it should introduce incentive mechanisms of achievement in wages on the third level, strengthen the coal- miners' preventive security management and the security concepts, and make the coal mine production safety in production reach to the objective requirements.