Research On Supply Chain Warranty Model With Game Theory

In this article,we establish our models from the viewpoint of pricing strategy,warranty maintenance strategy,information level and game theory.In the former part,we build two sub models.One is a two-echelon supply chain model which contains one manufacturer and many customers,while the other one is a three-echelon supply chain model which comprises one manufacturer,one retailer and many consumers.Therein,the manufacturer or the retailer provides warranty services to customers.Customers need to pay for warranty services.During the warranty pe-riod,once the equipment fails,the warranty provider carries out periodic preventive maintenance and minimal repair to ensure the equipment normal working.The inter-actions between the manufacturer and the retailer are modeled as a Stackelberg game.We obtain the optimal sale price,warranty price and the number of preventive mainte-nance actions by maximizing the profit of the service provider.Finally,the relationship between variables and key parameters is discussed and the profit in two sub models is illustrated via numerical examples.In the latter part,we study a mathematical model which contains one manufacturer and two retailers.Here the manufacturer decides his wholesale price according to two kinds of situations:(1)setting the same wholesale price to retailers ignoring the differ-ence due to sales cost;(2)setting the different wholesale price to retailers considering the difference due to sales cost.The relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer is modeled as a Stackelberg game.For one thing,we consider the case that the retailers' decision is the same.That is also to say,both of them all decide to cooper-ate with each other.Then we find the optimal wholesale price and warranty periods to obtain the optimal profit of both.We compare our results with the situation that they all select noncooperation via numerical examples.For the other thing,the case that one retailer is unclear about the other retailer's decision is discussed.We find that no matter what kind of pricing strategy is chosen by the manufacturer,the equilibrium strategies of the two retailers are(noncooperation,noncooperation).