Research On Market Participants' Interests Coordination And Policy Optimization Of Grain Circulation Market In The Perspective Of Efficiency

The grain output of China has reached 546.45 million tons in 2010, which increased 2.9% over 2009, and has registering the seventh consecutive annual increase. However, the condition of food security is still far from being satisfactory: imperfect grain circulation; the sharp regional and structural contradictions between food supply and demand; condition of output improvement without income increase happening frequently in major grain producing areas; uneven distribution of benefits and disparate development of regional economy between major grain producing areas and major grain sales areas; growing sales price disparities between raw grain and processed grain, which damaged the interests of peasants and consumers. These negative factors have caused a series of questions concerned, such as peasants lack productive enthusiasm,increasing of grain reserving cost,decreasing risk resistance capability of major grain sales areas and so on, which offset the improvement of food security level that has depended on grain yield expand for several years. Grain circulation is an important component of social commodity circulation, and a significant link to grain production and grain consumption. Looking from interests distribution of grain market at present, distributors hold most of profits in the grain industry chain, while interests of peasants and consumers are compressed. Therefore, it's necessary to control the grain circulation market and coordinate interests distribution of participants in the market in order to stabilize grain production, control grain prices, safeguard the consumers'interests and increase income of peasants.In the context of food security protection, based on related theories of micro-economics, game theory and information economics and econometrics, this paper studies interests participants'economic behavior of grain supply chain in the circulation efficiency perspective. First of all, it is by using two-tier market model that this paper analyses interests coordinate mode among interests participants in the grain circulation market, explores underlying negative reasons of grain circulation efficiency improvement. And then it calculates transaction efficiency, technically efficiency, scale efficiency and total factor productivity of the grain circulation enterprises applying research data in Hubei province in order to discuss transaction efficiency level and operational efficiency level of grain circulation industry in China at present. In the end, the research designs appropriate policy system to coordinate interests relationships in the market based on the conclusions of the study, considering the practical situation of grain production and circulation in China. The main contents and conclusions are as follows:Firstly, it is about the research of the status quo of grain circulation market in China. Under the double thrust of the stabilization of grain productivity and the deepening of grain circulation system marketlization reform, the focus of food security protection has been transferred from quantity safety to regional supply-demand security relying on circulation market. According to micro-economic theory, the key point of grain circulation security is to coordinate interests distribution of market participants. At present, there are many difficulties in interests coordination of market participants:At first, the market interests participants grow immaturely not only on the aspect of quantity but also on the economic strength of enterprises. Moreover, coordinate smoothly with grain production, which appear in unbalanced distribution of profits between major grain producing areas and major grain sales areas. Furthermore, government's policy targets conflict with the market operation of state-owned grain enterprises, which requires to establish adjustment measures of grain circulation system with Chinese characteristics.Secondly, it is to make economic analysis of interests coordination of participants in the grain purchasing market. Using two-tier market model, this chapter explores the relationships among peasants, private grain purchasing businessman, and the state-owned grain purchasing enterprises in the grain purchasing market. Also, it anatomizes the integrated effects of the minimum purchase price policy for grain. The results show that: enterprise's availability of grain is proportional to its transaction efficiency, which means the higher the transaction efficiency, the more grain the enterprise reachable. As well, the reduction of transaction expenses and the improvement of transaction efficiency are keys to coordinate benefits of the interest groups in the grain purchasing market and to stabilize the market order. At last, the actualization of the minimum purchase price policy for grain can achieve preferable economic benefits and social benefits in theory.Thirdly, it is to make economic analysis of interests coordination of participants in the grain sales market. This chapter explores the relationships among interest groups in the grain sales market in the clues of the transfer of the grain-ownership in the market, and then anatomizes main factors that hinder cross-regional grain circulation when the grain supply in the market is sufficient and un-sufficient with transaction cost theory using transaction cost theory. The results show that:â‘ in grain sales market with buyers market characteristics, large-scale enterprises that provide food to major grain sales areas will incline to decrease trading quantity in order to pay less transaction cost;â‘¡in grain sales market with sellers market characteristics, private grain enterprises will refuse to buy more grain with high marginal transaction cost, which will hamper the trading. In conclusion, reducing the transaction cost of enterprises is a breakthrough point to promote grain cross-region trading under above conditions. Therefore, reducing transaction cost and improving transaction efficiency of grain circulation enterprises are keys to promote cross-regional grain circulation.Fourthly, it is to calculate and analyze transaction efficiency of grain circulation enterprises. This chapter uses the transaction efficiency model that just only including price factor, which is inferred from iceberg-transaction model of Paul A.Samuelson, to calculate transaction efficiency of 21 enterprises in Hubei province from 2006 to 2008. By comparing transaction efficiency among enterprises, annual variability of transaction efficiency, transaction efficiency variation of enterprises which enjoy incentive policies, this chapter obtains conclusions as follow: the transaction efficiency of the grain circulation industry has been in high level but raised unstably; transaction efficiency disparity has lessening, however, the raising of transaction efficiency of single enterprise was unstable which was inconsistent with the development of the industry; the positive effects of the incentive policies to enterprises'transaction efficiency were inconspicuous.Fifthly, it is to calculate and analyze operation efficiency of grain circulation enterprises. Using data envelopment analysis, this chapter calculates technically efficiency, scale efficiency and total factor productivity of the 21 grain circulation enterprises in Hubei province from 2006 to 2009. Calculation results show that:resource allocation of most of the enterprises were unreasonable, and the optimization process of resource allocation was haphazard; incentive policies had few influences on variation of industry efficiency; the positive effect of the incentive policies to enterprises'efficiency improvement was obvious, however, this positive effect was unstable; the gaps between enterprises have deepening over time, which included economic strength and technology strength; production capacity of the industry based on technically efficiency improvement was sustainable, whereas scale efficiency of the industry has being fallen; although the sustainability of business operation was risen, the trend was unstable.Finally, it designs policy system of the grain circulation market. This chapter designs policy system of grain circulation market from the view of market participants' interests coordination and protection. Also, several suggestions are given to construct environmental hardware facilities of the grain circulation market.