| The rapid economic growth in China has made great achievements since the reform and opening up, while the dilemma of the low-end manufacturing industry in the global value chain forces China to an innovation-driven transformation stage. From the perspective of innovation input, the Research and Develoment (R&D) intensity of large and medium-sized industrial enterprises in China climbed from0.76%in2005to1.71%in2010, while the R&D intensity of United States, Germany and Janpan reached2.89%,2.64%and3.42%, respectively. From the perspective of innovation output, new products sales accounted for the proportion of main business income increased from9.9%in1991to15.7%in2007, while the average of United States, German and other developed countries are often more than50%. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a great gap of the average level of innovaiton between China and developed countries.From the perspective of the innovation determinants, ownership structure is an important factor affecting enterprise innovation decisions and performance. As ownership structure is dispersed in developed countries, principal-agent conflicts in corporate governance become the significant obstacle for innovation. However, concentrated ownership occupied a dominant position in emerging economies, which makes agent relationship undergo important changes. Because of the lack of external governance mechanism in such institutional environment, the conflicts between controlling shareholders and small shareholders insteads of conflicts between shareholders and occupation managers, namely principal-principal conflicts. The principal-agent relationship has changed in different economies, so that the relationship between ownership structure and innovation becomes more complicated. To solve the existing problems about Chinese enterprise innovation, we must and explore the internal forces and the mechanism of ownership structure on enterprise innovation based on the Chinese context. Therefore, it has important practical significance to study on the relationship between ownership structure and enterprise innovation.The current study explore the influence of ownership structure on innovation mainly involving the following three aspects:(1) the focus of the debate is whether there was an association between ownership structure and enterprise innovation;(2) concentrated ownership can be a more effective supervision method to carry out innovation activities and to improve the innovation performance;(3) as for the ownership type, the study emphasize different ownership types have heterogeneity influence on innovation. However, the existing research themes lack of associations with each other and organic integration. And most western scholars study on innovation from the developed countries. As a transition economy, China has its own characteristics. Therefore, the conclusion of the relationship between ownership structure and innovation may not be consistent with the developed countries. This paper is to discuss the influence of ownership structure on enterprise innovation from the perspective of agency theory. Based on the Chinese context, we can not help but ask:the principal-agent perspective can explain the relationship between ownership structure and innovation in Chinese context? Facing with the empirical results contradictory existing, what is the general conclusion about the relationship between ownership structure and innovation? Under the specific context of the Chinese national economy, how does the ownership structre influence on innovation in China? Furthermore, how does the ownership structre influence on innovation in Chinese state-owned enterprises?Focusing on the above questions, this paper made up the existing research from the following three aspects. The main work and conclusions in this paper are following:First, the traditional principal-agent theory can not fully explain the relationship between ownership structure and innovation in Chinese context. If the traditional principal-agent conflict perspective is stll used to understand thisrelationship, there are some deviations. In order to solve this problem, the third chapter therefore constructs the contextualization model of agency theory. We conclude that the principal-agent conflict and principal-principal conflicts is coexist within an organization. This provide a new theory for explaining the relationship between ownership structure and innovation.Second, there is still a lack of conclusions on the independent research and inconsistent findings. In this paper, the fourth chapter employed a meta-analysis on the43papers published from1988to2014. We conduct a quantitative analysis on the mixed results of the independent study. To obtain a general conclusion, we then analyzes the differences between individual studies. The results showed that the ownership concentration has a negative effect on the R&D investment, while has a positive effect on innovation performance. Because of its different motivation and resources, different ownership types have different effects on the principal-agent conflicts and principal-principal conflicts, and thus they have have different influences on the R&D investment and innovation performance.Third, the existing research ignored the context of the impact of ownership structure on innovation. In this paper, the fifth and the sixth capter used the total sample and sub sample data of Chinese industrial enterprises to test the relationship between ownership structure and innovation, respectively. It is found that concentrated ownership negatively associated with both R&D input and innovation output. State-owned enterprises are positively related to innovation input, while stated-owned enterprises have disadvantage at innovation output comparing with foreign-invested enterprises. Additionally, stated-owned enterprises and private-owned enterprises tress on performance comparing with foreign-invested enterprises. Further, the innovation status which is high input and low efficiency of stated-owned enterprises suggests that principal-agent conflicts are the principal contradiction of agency problems.The main objective of this paper is to reconsider the impact of the agency problems on the influence mechanism of ownership structure on the R&D investment and innovation performance. This paper enrich and develop the theory of agency theory and enterprise innovation strategy, providing the suggestions for the enterprises and promting the enterprise innovation level in china. The innovation of this paper lies in the following four aspects:First, this paper breaks through the existing research based on the traditional principal-agent theory Jimitations, combining principal-principal conflict to explain the relationship between ownership structure and innovation.Second, based on the agency theory model, this paper constructs a context model of agency theory to the further develop the agency theory, which implicates the principal-agent conflict and principal-principal conflict is coexist within an organization.Third, the existing research about the ownership structure and innovation of the conclusion is inconsistent, and lacks of analysis, summary and interpretation among the differences arising from the results of these studies. This paper innovatively uses a meta-analysis to obtain general conclusion on the relationship between ownership structre and innovation, providing an important reference for further study in this field.Fourth, the existing research ignored the impact of ownership structure on innovation in transition economies. Combining with the characteristics of different ownership structure in a transition economy, this paper examined the relationship between ownership structure and innovation, which is a high degree fit of the innovation driven visual angle for governance structure of Chinese enterprise.
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