Researching On Precaution Machanism Of Moral Hazard Of State-Owned Enterprises' Executives Based On Principal-Agent Therory

In China, The dominant position of public ownership decides that the government acts not only the role of macroeconomic regulation and control, but also the role of manager of the micro-economic entities operators. Government as an impersonal subject manages state-owned assets through a multi-level principal-agent chain and finally by state-owned operators. From that complex principal-agent relationship results to operators erosion national interests of the owner. The loss of state-owned assets is severe. This paper uses the theory on the basis of new institutional economics analysis tools, certificates the nature of the relationship between government and enterprises. Sums up the experience of our own country, and at the meantime learns from other countries the advanced management. According to this, we conclude the method and path for the moral hazard prevention of state-owned enterprise operators.Firstly, by comparing the relevant concepts, we define the normal meaning of principal-agent relationship. Then introduce formation and characteristics of the principal-agent relationship in enterprise. Sum up the source and connotation of moral hazard especially to executives. Furthermore, we introduce the necessity of its coming, analyze the fundamental cause of moral hazard. By exploring the necessity of moral risk of state-owned enterprises, we can get a better understanding of the following chapters.Secondly, conduct from the experience of stat-owned enterprise reform analysis the principle-agent relationship level of state-owned enterprise. We can conclude the special properties of moral hazard type in china and list out. Then we summarize its critical reason, research possible reasons and offer research directions.Thirdly, following the basic principles of moral hazard prevention mechanism and contrasting the developed country's enterprise management system, review on the current Chinese state-owned executives moral hazard mechanism and analysis the defects of it.Finally, in view of the moral hazard of state-owned enterprises we begin with the enhancement of governmental function by contrasting the experience of developed country's enterprise management system. With the aim of external and internal systematization, we put forward the plans, based on legal and constraint mechanism, for prevention strategy of moral hazard of state-owned executives which suitable for our national condition.