Researching On The Government And State-Owned Enterprises On Principal-Agent Relations

The purpose of this paper is not to put state-owned enterprise reform in the field of public administration, but hopes to examine its management of state-owned enterprises under the perspective of government. In China, the government plays not only the role of macroeconomic regulation and control, but also the role of manager of the micro-economic entities operators. For a long time, while the government tries to seek both, it often attends to one thing and loses another. This paper uses the theory on the basis of new institutional economics analysis tools, clarifies the nature of the relationship between government and enterprises, analyzes the reform of state-owned enterprises from the former time, sums up the experience of our country, and at the same time learns from other countries the advanced management. According to this, we conclude the method and path for the management of state-owned enterprise.Firstly, by comparing the relevant concepts, we define the meaning of principal-agent, and then sum up the characteristics of principal-agent relationship. Furthermore, we introduce the reasons of its coming, analyze the fundamental cause of endogenous contradictions and external performance and put forward feasible solutions. By exploring the necessity of principal-agent relationship of state-owned enterprises, we can get a better understanding of the following chapters.Secondly, previous experience in the reform of state-owned enterprises is good to demonstrate the rationality of the status of principal-agent relationship, and to look forward its future trend. By starting from the central enterprise special relationship between the agents, we straighten out different levels between the central enterprise's principal agents. Then we summarize its apparent problem, evaluate possible solutions and offer research directions.Thirdly, contrasting the United States, France, South Korea, Singapore's state-owned enterprise management system, we come up with the mature management of the four countries and it can be used as a reference for the central enterprise's principal agent relations.Finally, in view of its main problem, we begin with the separation of governmental function. On the basis of the difference between capitals and assets and of law, with the core of remaining possessing rights, and with the aim of external and internal systematization, we put forward the plans, based on incentive and constraint mechanism, for principal agent relations between government and state-owned enterprises which suitable for our national condition.