Font Size: a A A

The Study Of The State-owned Enterprise Based On Principal-agent Theory

Posted on:2011-09-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:R Y BaiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360308490881Subject:Political economy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
China's state-owned enterprises are the backbone of the socialist market economy, since the reform and opening up more than 30 years, the core of the China's economic reform has always been the state-owned enterprise. First of all, it is the idea of devolution of power including the expansion of enterprise autonomy,the implementation of economic responsibility,two-step turning profits into taxes,and contract responsibility system. Finally, they explored the establishment of a modern enterprise system. Although the state-owned enterprises are becoming much more efficient, the principal-agent problem have not got a good solution.Being a branch of the theory of modern enterprise, the principal-agent theory is appeared along with the corporate separation of ownership and management rights. The main contents it studies are the proceeds principal-agent problem, agency cost, the incentive and restraint mechanisms, while the principal-agent relationship still has the spear and shield, such as the objective function which is inconsistency, information asymmetry, inequality risk of the responsibility, etc.Principal-agent relationship exists objectively in our country's state-owned enterprises. Due to the nature of property, they have made the principal-agent relationship more complicated and given rise to more severe principal-agent problem. The purpose of China's state-owned enterprise reform is to resolve the principal-agent problem. Through the studies of the state-owned enterprises entrusted problems, agency problems and contractual issues in a concrete analysis of the executable, I find that the best way to solve the principal-agent problem of China's state-owned enterprises is to reform the property rights system and build a sound and effective incentive and restraint mechanisms. Therefore, in the last part of this article, the author is trying to use the principal-agent theory, on the state-owned enterprises' property rights,incentives,supervision and restraint mechanisms, propose some measures and proposals for the state-owned enterprises.
Keywords/Search Tags:state-owned enterprise, principal-agent relationship, incentive and restriction
PDF Full Text Request
Related items