A Study On Principal-agent Relationship Of The State-owned Enterprise In Our Country

Separation of the property rights and the operating right is the modern enterprise's characteristic. The information is not symmetric, the contract is incompletely, the benefit of both sides (principal and agent) is not coincident, those make it difficult to avoid the principal-agent problems. The principal-agent problems of state-owned enterprise are even more complicated because of its special property rights relationships.In the nearly thirty years of state-owned enterprise reform course, it is successively experienced a series of reforms such as releasing authority and letting the advantage, changing profit to tax revenue, the contract management responsibility system, the establishment of modern enterprise system and so on. In this process, the clear property rights, the expanded independent enterprise operating right, face to the market and competitive system is the reform orientation. When I deal with principal-agent relationships in the state-owned enterprise, we should change the statement of stimulating purely dependent on salary. We must strengthen the function of market competitive system, which is also the reform orientation.Some principal-agent problems which appear in the state-owned enterprise such as the internal controls, agents plot together. These all can be restrained by market reputation mechanism. Fama thought that the reputation mechanism can totally replace the dominant income drive system, but his conclusion based on the suppose of perfect competition market. In reality, it is not impossible to achieve. Thereupon, the article has established a dynamic gambling model which salary and reputation mechanism affect together. The model proves that the reputation mechanism is truly helpful to enhance the managers' enthusiasm.Clear property right is the basic premise which the market mechanism can smoothly move, therefore we should further strengthen the property right reform of state-owned enterprise. Based on property right reform, it is necessary to stimulate and restrain the manager. We can use motivation ways such as yearly salary system, stock future right, self-realization. Meanwhile we should run the operator's responsibility. At the same time, we should have the market and reputation mechanism stimulate and restrain managers of the state-owned enterprise.