Research On Game And Contract Design Of The E-tailer Supply Chain

In recent years,with the profound changes in the social and economic environment and the transformation of consumption concepts,online shopping has increasingly become one of the mainstream consumption patterns,which makes many enterprises regard the e-tailer platform as a key link in the supply chain one after another,thus forming an e-tailer supply chain.In the e-tailer supply chain composed of an e-tailer and a third-party logistics provider(TPL),the e-tailer can facilitate the shopping process of consumers by optimizing the design of the platform,and the TPL can improve the speed and quality of logistics and distribution to improve consumers’ experience.However,in the absence of a corresponding coordination contract,both parties will pursue the maximization of their own interests,which will damage the interests of the entire supply chain.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the contract coordination among the members of the e-tailer supply chain.This paper introduces promotion effort of the e-tailer and logistics service effort of the TPL into the e-tailer supply chain,and uses the Stackelberg game and Stackelberg differential game methods to study the pricing and contract design problems of the e-tailer supply chain.Considering that logistics service contracts may be provided by the e-tailer or TPL,this paper defines two different timing sequences.Considering that the sale price of the product may be exogenous or endogenous,game models under the centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making are constructed respectively,and the members’ optimal strategies are obtained by solving the models.Finally,three types of contract are designed to coordinate the supply chain,and the validity of the contract is verified through numerical experiments and the impact of related parameters on the e-tailer supply chain is analyzed.On this basis,considering the long-term dynamic impact of logistics service efforts on demand in the e-tailer supply chain,this paper further uses differential game theory to study the pricing and contract design of the e-tailer supply chain.Differential game models under the centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making are constructed,and a cost-sharing contract is introduced to coordinate the e-tailer supply chain.Numerical experiments are used to analyze the influence of parameters on the optimal results.The results show that no matter whether the product price is exogenous or endogenous,the promotion effort of the e-tailer,logistics service effort of the TPL,brand goodwill,market demand and total profit of the e-tailer supply chain under the centralized decision-making are greater than those under the decentralized decision-making.When product price is exogenous,both promotion effort and logistics service effort vary with timing sequence and contract type.The cost-sharing contract offered by the TPL can make e-tailer the best effort,and vice versa.Compared to fixed-price and revenue-sharing contracts,the cost-sharing contract offered by the e-tailer is beneficial to the TPL.When product price is endogenous,cost-sharing contract provided by the TPL is more effective than the fixed-price contract.Considering the dynamic impact of logistics effort on demand,when price is exogenous,selling price has a positive impact on both logistics effort and market demand,while initial brand goodwill has a negative impact on it.When price is endogenous,logistics service effort,brand goodwill and sales price are all affected by the initial size of the market.In conclusion,the cost-sharing contract effectively coordinates the e-tailer supply chain.The paper has 26 pictures,5 tables,and 75 references.