| As a green and efficient multimodal transport mode,rail-road intermodal transport has been vigorously promoted by the state.The Outline for the Construction of a Strong Transportation State proposes to promote the orderly transfer of bulk cargo and medium-and long-distance cargo transportation to rail and water transportation.Promote standardized facilities and equipment for rapid inter-modal change and transfer,and form unified multimodal transport standards and rules.With the rapid development of rail-road intermodal transport,China’s rail-road intermodal transport business has begun to take shape.Container freight volume of rail-road intermodal transport grew from less than 100 million tons in 2015 to 566 million tons in 2021,an increase of more than four times.However,China’s rail-road intermodal transport has the problem of unreasonable profit distribution among participating enterprises and low synergy,which makes it relatively difficult to carry out rail-road intermodal transport business and low operational efficiency.In this case,the network freight operators as a third party,to participate in the identity of the carrier in the rail-road intermodal transport business,can balance the distribution of profits between road freight enterprises and railroad freight enterprises,to achieve the optimization of the operation of rail-road intermodal transport.Therefore,it is important to study the profit distribution of rail-road intermodal transport with the participation of network freight operators.This paper constructs a game model of profit distribution of intermodal transport under the participation of network freight operators based on the Stackelberg game to analyze the impact of the participation of network freight operators on the profit distribution of intermodal transport,to clarify the optimal market price and the profit of each participant,and finally to determine the superiority of the network freight operator model.This paper is divided into six chapters,Chapter 1 is the introduction,which introduces the background and significance of the study,reviews the domestic and international literature,presents the research objectives and research content,describes the technical route and research methods and puts forward the research innovation points.Chapter 2 is the theory and method of profit allocation of intermodal transport under the participation of network freight operators,which mainly includes the meaning,role and operation mode of network freight operators;the meaning,characteristics and operation process of intermodal transport;the theory and method of profit allocation of intermodal transport,including the object,principle and method of profit allocation.Chapter 3 is the decision mode of public-rail intermodal transport and Stackelberg game analysis,which elaborates the path of profit distribution of public-rail intermodal transport,analyzes two major public-rail intermodal transport decision modes of centralized decision making and decentralized decision making,and conducts three major Stackelberg game analysis under the participation of road freight enterprise dominant,railroad freight enterprise dominant and network freight operators.Chapter 4 establishes the game models of intermodal transport under the domination of road freight enterprises and rail freight enterprises respectively,firstly,determines the dominant and the follower,then determines the profit function and constructs the game model,and finally verifies them through case analysis.Chapter 5 establishes the game model of public-rail intermodal transport with the participation of network freight operators,determines the dominant and the follower of the game,analyzes the game order,then determines the profit function and constructs the game model,and verifies it through the analysis of cases.Chapter 6 is the conclusion,which summarizes and outlooks the main research work of this paper,clarifies the superiority of the network freight operator model,and outlooks the next research direction. |