| China has achieved significant achievements on railway infrastructure construction in recent years, but did not give full play to the railway transportation advantages; though steady progress was made in the reform of railway transportation, many problems such as low-quality of both ends of services, weak marketing abilities, and inflexible pricing mechanisms still exist. Further reform is still needed. The construction of railway logistics center is running into the period of system development, Promotion of the development of railway logistics center service function in the direction of diversification and rapid development of the railway "door to door" whole logistics services become the core contents of the further construction of railway logistics center. Based on the larger changes currently happened on the market supply and demand of railway transportation in our country and the current situations of railway transportation reform and the construction of railway logistics center, speeding up the construction of railway logistics center, building effective multimodal transport system of railway logistics center, enriching railway logistics center service functions and developing the railway "door to door" whole logistics services rapidly are the inevitable requirements for our railway transportation to meet the market supply and demand changes, the only way to further reform our country's railway and the inexorable trend of the own construction and development of railway logistics center. To build an integrative multimodal transport system and to develop the railway "door to door" whole logistics services, we need to realize the win-win economic benefits between the railway logistics center and highway and railway transport enterprises, realize benefit maximization of road and railway multimodal transport system and meanwhile ensure that each participating companies also gain greater benefits.In view of the above-mentioned facts, this paper conducts a study on the issue of "paper conducts ation between railway logistics center and highway and railway transport enterprises issue on Stackelberg pricing game model, from the angle of supply chain management, aiming at laying a theoretical foundation for the synergetic development of real railway logistics center and highway and railway transport enterprises through the theoretical exploration. The main research contents and results of this paper include:1. The paper defined the concepts of the railway logistics center and the highway and railway multimodal transport system from the perspective of system theory, built the conceptual model of synergy of the railway logistics center and the highway and railway multimodal transport system based on synergetic theory, and conducted analyzes and studies on the meaning of internal coordination, the division and characteristics of synergy stages of the railway logistics center and the highway and railway multimodal transport system;2. In order to fix an effective price on the integrated highway and railway multimodal transport logistics services and realize the synergy of the highway and railway multimodal transport system in primary synergy stage, that is integrated logistics services stage, at first, the paper conducted an analysis and research on the pricing strategies of general highway and railway multimodal transport logistics services, of which the demand fluctuations are relatively stable:based on additive demand fluctuations, the paper constructed a pricing game model under centralized control, a Nash game model when both parties have dominant rights and Stackelberg game models under each party's domination respectively and gained optional pricing strategies of highway and railway transport enterprises under above four conditions. At the same time, this paper analyzed the influence of domination on the cooperative pricing strategy of the two parties, which shows that:the agreed transport price under the domination of both parties is higher that the transport prices agreed when the parties dominate respectively; when the dominant right transfers from railway enterprises to highway enterprises, the market transport price increases; under centralized control mode, the efficiency of the supply chain is highest, while under the domination of highway transport enterprises, the efficiency is lowest; railway transport enterprises can increase their profits when holding domination right. On the basis of above results, this paper conducted a further analysis and research on the pricing strategies of new type highway and railway multimodal transport logistics services, of which the demand fluctuations are relatively higher:based on multiplicative demand fluctuations, the paper constructed Stackelberg game models under each party's domination respectively and gained optional pricing strategies of both parties under multiplicative demand fluctuations. Meanwhile, the paper analyzed the influence of random fluctuation on the cooperative pricing strategy of the two parties, which shows that:under multiplicative demand fluctuations, dispersion of decision-making will still lead to decrease of the total profits of the supply chain and railway transport enterprises can still increase their profits and the total profits of the supply chain when holding domination right; in addition, the increase of market demand fluctuations will lead to great decrease of both parties'profits.3. In order to coordinate the highway and railway multimodal transport logistics services supply chain participated by railway logistic center and realize the synergy of the highway and railway multimodal transport system in intermediate synergy stage, that is the synergy in the highway and railway multimodal transport logistics services supply chain stage, at first, the paper conducted an analysis and research on the coordination problem of highway and railway multimodal transport logistics services supply chain participated by railway logistic center and owns alternative highway and railway enterprises:based on non-cooperative game theory, the paper constructed game models under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making respectively. Through comparison, it is found that under decentralized decision-making, the supply chain exists efficiency loss; the paper coordinated the supply chain under decentralized decision-making taking advantage of the revenue sharing contract based on incremental profit and system contribution, it indicated that:these two revenue sharing mechanisms both can coordinate the supply chain effectively; under certain conditions, revenue sharing coefficients in these two mechanisms show the same characteristics; in the second mechanism, the higher the cost advantage of highway and railway transport enterprises have, the higher the profits they gained. On the basis of above results, the paper further conducted an analysis and research on the pricing strategies and coordination problems of logistics services supply chain in consideration of enterprises'social responsibilities:it constructed pricing game models under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making respectively and gained optional pricing strategies of logistics services supply chain in consideration of enterprises'social responsibilities and the enterprises'social responsibilities cost borne by each party respectively. Based on revenue sharing contract, the paper conducted coordination on them, it shows that:in consideration of enterprises'social responsibilities and under centralized decision-making, the logistics services supply chain has higher total profits and there are positive correlation between both parties' profits and their social responsibilities utility factors. Revenue sharing contract can coordinate the logistics services supply chain effectively.4. In order to promote the formation of the alliance between railway logistic center and highway and railway transport enterprises, ensure the alliance's stability and realize the advanced synergy stage of the highway and railway multimodal transport system, that is the synergy in strategic alliance stage, the paper conducted an analysis and research on the earnings statement and distribution of the alliance of railway logistic center and highway and railway multimodal transport:at first, it analyzed the essence of railway logistic center and highway and railway multimodal transport, constructed pricing game models under different alliance constructions, and gained the earnings of different alliance constructions by solving the models. It distributed the earnings of the alliance under different cooperative constructions by advantage of Myerson value method and adjusted the distribution schemes further considering the inputs of resources. The research shows that:the more enterprises participating into the alliance, the more advantages it has on both customers and the railway logistic center; the earning of the alliance is related to the number of enterprises participating into the alliance and unrelated to the nature of the enterprises participating into the alliance; the lower the transport costs of highway and railway enterprises are, the earnings of the alliance and the total profits of the supply chain are higher; finally, through verification of examples, we can distribute the earnings of the alliance fairly and effectively based on the Mverson value method. |
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